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THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE POLLUTION CONTROL
CASES: ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL AND PRO-BUSINESS?
Mark Latham"
The nearly physical revulsion many conservatives feel for environmental
groups and values, and their reflex action to protect business being en-
croached upon, threaten to wipe out all the gains that preceded this
Court. Raw political partisanship that sees the [Rehnquist] Court side
with business interests is most apparent in environmental cases. The
courts are in lockstep with the Right's attempts, outside the courts, to
weaken the enforcement of environmental laws.'
The above quote is but one of many that, with respect to the envi-
ronment, serve as a damning indictment of the Rehnquist Court as
an anti-environmental,2 pro-business 3 Supreme Court, one that was
openly hostile towards environmental statutes and regulations4 and
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MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF
AMERICAN LAw 185 (2002).
2 See Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in Envi-
ronmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 547, 568 n.101 (1997) ("Particularly during the
Rehnquist Court, the Justices have sometimes seemed 'out of sync' with the general pub-
lic, which has adopted environmentalism as a consensus value."); see also Christine A.
Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2003) (asserting,
after an evaluation of natural resources cases, that "the modem Court has been consis-
tently hostile to environmental regulation"); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environ-
mental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 716-17 (2000)
("ChiefJustice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the environmental community
for being unsympathetic to environmental protection concerns. There is some basis for
that reputation in many of his votes.");Jeffery G. Miller, The Supreme Court's Water Pollution
Jurisprudence: Is the Court All Wet?, 24 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 125, 125 (2005) (noting, in a critique
of the Rehnquist Court's Clean Water Act cases, that "[s]ome of my environmental law
colleagues have long lamented that the Supreme Court is anti-environmental").
3 See, e.g., GARBUS, supra note 1, at 2 ("The Rehnquist Court elevates the protection of
property rights over personal rights to protect big business-the drug, tobacco, and oil
companies-at the expense of the environment, the consumer, and the citizens.").
4 See, e.g., James R. May & Robert L. Glicksman, Justice Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Envi-
ronmental Law, [2006] 36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10585, 10587 (asserting that
while serving as Associate Justice and Chief Justice, William Rehnquist's "efforts to curtail
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biased against environmental plaintiffs, particularly environmental
public interest groups that sought redress by filing citizen suits in
federal court.5 Are such negative assertions about the environmental
record of the Rehnquist Court, and the troubling questions they raise
concerning fairness by our court of last resort, accurate?
In an effort to answer this important question regarding the Su-
preme Court's environmental jurisprudence, this Article examines a
substantial segment of the Court's environmental opinions-
specifically, a number of the cases decided by the Court under the
"pollution control" statutes during the leadership of William H.
Rehnquist as Chief Justice.6 An assessment of every case decided by
the Rehnquist Court under all federal environmental statutes is too
much to consider in one article, but the cases decided under the pol-
lution control statutes collectively form a manageable, yet substantial,
part of the Supreme Court's overall historical environmental record,
since the Court during the Rehnquist era decided close to twenty-five
cases where the underlying issues arose under one or more of these
statutes.' Thus, the focus of this Article is on the Rehnquist Court's
federal power, promote state prerogatives, and protect private property rights have in no
small way helped to dismantle important aspects of modem environmental law"); Albert
C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court's 2003-04 Term, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 565, 565 (2005) (arguing that the environmental cases decided during the
Rehnquist Court's 2003 October Term "continue a trend in the gradual, but discernible,
erosion of environmental law and of governmental authority to address environmental
concerns").
5 See, e.g., LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 66 (2001) (criticizing the Rehnquist
Court's decisions in environmental citizen-suit standing cases, concluding that "by skew-
ing Article III in such a backward-looking manner, the Court stifles the evolution of envi-
ronmental law so that it cannot deal effectively with the magnitude of modern environ-
mental problems").
6 The use of the term "pollution control" statutes in this Article refers to the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)-(y) (2000), the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000), the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000), the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671 (2000), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000), and the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000 & Supp.
III 2003). See generally Lazarus, supra note 2, at 705 (noting that the Court's environ-
mental cases divide into natural resource cases and pollution control cases).
7 See generally Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (FIFRA); Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (CERCLA); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (CAA); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Micco-
sukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (CWA); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (CAA); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457
(2001) (CAA); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001) (CWA); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
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decisions arising under the pollution control statutes, including, in
particular, those primarily involving challenges by business interests
and suits brought by environmental groups. By focusing on these
cases, I seek to answer the question that was initially posed: Whether
the Rehnquist Court is properly characterized as pro-business and
anti-environmental.
My analysis of these key pollution control cases leads to the con-
clusion that the Rehnquist Court was not anti-environmental or pro-
business, nor was the Court during his tenure as Chief Justice, from
1986 to 2005, openly hostile towards environmental plaintiffs or the
environmental regulatory structure. Despite assertions to the con-
trary, the analysis I have conducted of important cases involving the
construction and application of the pollution control statutes shows
that the Rehnquist Court preserved these statutes against a number
of aggressive attacks that, if successful, would have resulted in a sig-
nificant blow to the very foundation of federal environmental protec-
tion. Instead, despite facing a number of challenges on a variety of
grounds, it is because of the Rehnquist Court that these statutes re-
main intact and in full force today as an indispensable component of
federal statutory-based environmental protection. As such, the analy-
sis of the cases I present casts serious doubt on the proposition that
the Rehnquist Court was clearly anti-environmental and pro-business
in resolving cases arising under the pollution control statutes.
No analysis of the Rehnquist Court can ignore the new life that
federalism found during Rehnquist's term as Chief Justice, and in-
deed federalism has relevancy to the Court's treatment of cases aris-
ing under the pollution control statutes. Not only has federalism
been implicated in some of the pollution control cases decided by the
Rehnquist Court, but the rebirth of federalism during his tenure as
Chief Justice also served to fuel the contention that the Rehnquist
528 U.S. 167 (2000) (CWA); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (CERCLA);
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (EPCRA); Meghrig v. KFC W.,
Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (RCRA); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994)
(CERCLA); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700
(1994) (CWA); City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994) (RCRA); City of
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (CWA and the Solid Waste Disposal Act); U.S.
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (CWA and RCRA); Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91 (1992) (CWA); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (FIFRA);
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (RCRA); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (CERCLA), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996); Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987) (CWA); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (CWA); Int'l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (CWA).
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Court was an anti-environmental Court.8 Thus, Part I of this Article
provides an overview of federalism in the Rehnquist Court and the
significance of its reemergence to the pollution control cases and
statutes. Part II focuses on several of the major pollution control
cases decided by the Rehnquist Court, and discusses how the Court's
decisions in those cases were influenced by federalism to balance
competing federal and state interests in not only pollution control,
but also corporate law and land use planning. Part III examines a
principle closely tied to federalism, the doctrine of preemption, and
analyzes how the Court rejected preemption challenges to state and
local pollution control regulations to further maintain the delicate
balance that exists between our dual sovereigns, the federal and state
governments. Part IV discusses pollution control cases that impli-
cated neither federalism nor preemption, and evaluates how,
through its approach to statutory interpretation, the Rehnquist Court
preserved critical aspects of pollution control statutes from statutory-
construction-based challenges.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Importance of the Rehnquist Court to Federal Environmental Law
William H. Rehnquist served as the sixteenth Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court9 for nineteen of his thirty-three years on the Court,
until his death in 2005.1° Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was in fre-
quent disagreement with Rehnquist in a number of cases heard dur-
ing the Rehnquist era, nonetheless described him as "a great chief
justice."" Rehnquist's successor and former law clerk, current Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., agreed with Justice Marshall and said in
memoriam that "[t]he Chief is a towering figure in American law,
one of a handful of great Chief Justices."'' 2 Another of his former law
8 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 2, at 1-2 (noting that the Rehnquist Court's federalism deci-
sions, especially those regarding the Commerce Clause, raised "the fear that federal envi-
ronmental law may be particularly vulnerable to the Court's shrinking view of commerce
clause authority because environmental protection frequently requires the regulation of
intrastate, noneconomic activities").
9 DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 3
(1992).
10 Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Is Dead at 80, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 38.
11 Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Rehnquist Court, 37 NAT'LJ. 1532, 1533 (2005).
12 ChiefJusticeJohn G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2 (2005).
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clerks portrayed Chief Justice Rehnquist as a man who "treated eve-
ryone alike-the powerful and the ordinary. He knew the name of
virtually every Court employee, and when he saw a new employee, he
would introduce himself as 'Bill Rehnquist.' He always remembered
that person's name." 13
The era of the Rehnquist Court began on September 26, 1986,14
when Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, took the oath to serve as
the Chief Justice after the Senate voted 65 to 3315 to approve his
nomination by President Reagan.' 6 This new era of the Supreme
Court also roughly coincided with Congress's passage of the full spec-
trum of statutes that serve today as the foundation of federal envi-
ronmental protection. 7  As a consequence of this confluence of a
13 Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., In Memory of William H. Rehnquist: A Tribute to ChiefJustice William H.
Rehnquist, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1675, 1681 (2006).
14 TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2000) (de-
scribing Rehnquist's sweaing in as ChiefJustice).
15 See THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS AND LEGACY
13 (2005) (noting that "[t]his was the closest vote for a chief justice in American his-
tory").
16 Originally nominated to the Court by President Nixon, William H. Rehnquist was an As-
sociate justice for fourteen years prior to becoming Chief Justice. E.g., THOMAS M. KECK,
THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM 115 (2004). As has been well documented, Rehnquist's nominations to
serve as both Associate and Chief Justice were quite controversial. See generally MARK
TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 17-32 (2005) (mentioning accusations by those opposed to
Rehnquist's nomination that he was not committed to civil rights). The thirty-three votes
opposing his nomination in the Senate were the highest number of negative votes that
any successful nominee had ever received, only later to be eclipsed by the forty-eight
negative votes Clarence Thomas received in his confirmation process. Id. at 32.
17 The start of intense congressional action on the environmental front started in 1970 with
the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4347 (2000). Significant congressional action on the environmental legislation
front came to a close with a major overhaul of the CAA. In between enactment of NEPA
and the CAA Amendments of 1990, Congress adopted the following environmental stat-
utes: FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)-(y) (2000); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(2000); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), often referred to as the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-25 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000); CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); and EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000 & Supp. III
2003). For a fuller listing of the pollution control statutes this Article addresses, see supra
note 6. For a chronology of the federal environmental law movement, see generally
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1146-71 (1995). And for a discussion of the changing levels of state
and federal involvement in environmental regulation, see generally Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553,
635-36 (2001).
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presidential nomination and a period of intense congressional legis-
lative action, the Rehnquist Court, unlike any other in the history of
the Supreme Court, was presented with a unique opportunity. From
1986 until 2005, the Court had multiple occasions to shape and guide
federal environmental law through its approach to statutory interpre-
tation and application of core constitutional principles to this new
body of federal environmental legislation.18  And the Rehnquist
Court did decide a rich diversity of cases under virtually every one of
the pollution control statutes, including the Clean Water Act (CWA),
the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).19
True, federal environmental statutes did exist prior to the
Rehnquist Court.20 However, it was only following a focused, intense
period of congressional action, spanning two decades, that truly
meaningful environmental statutes were enacted at the federal level.2'
This wave of new federal environmental legislation required an inde-
pendent federal agency to administer the nascent statutory regime
through the development and implementation of regulations and
policy. This administrative need led to the creation of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), where, for the first time, a coordi-
nated regulatory effort targeting environmental protection found a
home in a single, stand-alone federal agency within the Executive
Branch. 22
18 See May & Glicksman, supra note 4, at 10,585 (2006) (noting that "Rehnquist was uniquely
situated to have a profound impact on the development of federal environmental law-
both because of the overlap of his tenure with the development of the field of environ-
mental law and because of his long tenure on the Court. His appointment corresponds
almost exactly with the birth of modem federal environmental law... ").
19 See supra note 7.
20 See, e.g., Rivers and Harbor Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (2000)) (requiring prior approval of the Chief of Engineers before
building certain obstructions, such as wharves, in navigable waters).
21 See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, An Analysis of the Rights-Based Justification for Federal Interven-
tion in Environmental Regulation, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 185, 185-86 (2003) ("The
federalization of environmental law began in earnest when President Nixon's signing of
the National Environmental Policy Act was nationally televised on January 1, 1970. Be-
tween 1970 and 1980, the federal government enacted no less than ten major environ-
mental regulatory schemes.").
22 Prior to the establishment of the EPA, to the extent that there were federal regulatory
efforts focusing on environmental issues, these efforts were diffuse and spread among a
variety of federal agencies. One goal in creating the EPA was to centralize efforts target-
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The environmental statutes enacted by Congress were an entirely
new and complex corpus of laws, coupled with the equally, if not
more so, complex body of regulations promulgated by the EPA.23
These statutes and regulations provided ample opportunities for ten-
sions to develop between various constituencies subject to the new
statutes and regulations, such as public interest groups seeking to
broaden the reach of federal environmental protection where it was
perceived that Congress or the EPA fell short of adequately protect-
ing the environment. The tensions and competing interests that
arose from the novel federal environmental statutes and their im-
plementing regulations often resulted in the initiation of litigation,
giving the judiciary an opportunity to clarify and control the direc-
tion of environmental law on a scale never seen before in the federal
courts. As a result of such litigation under this new body of laws and
regulations, a number of these cases eventually found their way to the
Supreme Court. And as a result, the Rehnquist Court had before it
almost every Term cases involving the meaning of a particular federal
environmental statute or questions of whether EPA action or inaction
was consistent with congressional intent.
It is also true that the Supreme Court decided a number of his-
toric environmental cases well before the Rehnquist Court, and in
fact well before Rehnquist served on the Court as an Associate Jus-
tice. 4 Prior to the establishment of the federal statutory-based envi-
ing environmental issues and relocate much of these efforts in a single agency. Memo-
randum from the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization to the Presi-
dent (Apr. 29, 1970), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/ash.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2007).
23 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 317 (1985) (recognizing that the "network of
national [environmental] statutes-together with a much larger body of implementing
regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency-now constitutes one
of the most pervasive systems of national regulation known to American law").
24 See generally United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (holding that un-
der the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, a court was allowed to order injunctive relief
against illegal dumping of industrial waste); New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585
(1931) (holding that the City of New York was enjoined from dumping waste off the coast
of NewJersey); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) (holding that Illinois could not
divert excess water from Lake Michigan); Nw. Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S.
486 (1916) (holding that a local smoke regulation ordinance was enforceable); Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (upholding a state law banning
transportation of water into another state); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (ordering an injunction against a copper company for polluting air of another
state); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (determining that the drainage of water
into Lake Michigan could not be enjoined, absent a showing of deleterious effects of such
water).
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ronmental protection regime, however, the environmental cases the
Court decided were, by and large, federal common-law-based claims
and were not grounded in any particular environment-focused statute
or regulation. Thus, at no other time in the history of the Court, un-
til the Rehnquist Court, were the Justices regularly considering cases
Term after Term that required the need to interpret federal envi-
ronmental legislation.
Consequently, the Rehnquist Court was the first Supreme Court to
consistently confront a variety of issues not only under the pollution
control statutes, but also under the entire spectrum of federal envi-
ronmental laws. Therefore, the Court was placed in the unique posi-
tion of establishing the foundation for its approach to interpreting
this new collective body of federal statutory law that evolved during
Rehnquist's era as Chief Justice. As the first Chief Justice to lead the
Court through the cases that arose from the full range of environ-
mental statutes Congress enacted beginning in the 1970s, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and his Court, if for no other reason than historic ac-
cident, could not help but to have an enduring impact on the area of
environmental jurisprudence. It is as a result of this convergence be-
tween legislative action and the elevation of William H. Rehnquist to
Chief Justice that the Rehnquist Court will continue to influence, for
the foreseeable future, the Supreme Court's approach to environ-
mental cases, and in particular those that arise under the pollution
control statutes.
B. The Power to Influence the Direction of the Court
Before delving into the specific key pollution control cases de-
cided by the Rehnquist Court, and analyzing why those cases do not
support the claims that the Rehnquist Court was pro-business and
anti-environmental, one preliminary question to ask is whether it is
even proper to refer to the Supreme Court as the "Rehnquist Court,"
or otherwise to denote the Court as being under the influence to any
major degree of a particular Chief Justice. After all, the Supreme
Court consists of the Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices, and
each member has one vote. That is, the Chief Justice's vote counts
for no more than any other member's vote. 2 5 The Associate Justices,
25 See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 341, 349 (2004) (stating that "[t]he standard attitudinal model that has pre-
dominated until recently among empirical political scientists who study the Court as-
cribes no special weight to the ChiefJustice's vote, instead treating it as one of nine equal
covariates for modeling purposes").
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moreover, just as the Chief Justice, have been nominated by the
President, confirmed by a majority of the Senate, and, perhaps most
important in terms of susceptibility to influence, "shall hold their Of-
fices during good Behaviour,2 6 and essentially serve lifetime ap-
pointments in their positions as Justices. Thus, the ability of the
Chief Justice to sway the other members of the Court to a particular
point of view may appear quite limited.
The ability of the Chief Justice to influence the direction and de-
cision making of the Supreme Court, however, should not be under-
estimated, 7 despite the fact that the Court is composed of eight other
independent legal thinkers. The specific powers that William
Rehnquist as the Chief Justice would, and did, possess were well
summarized during the deliberations in the Senate over his nomina-
tion to lead the Court:
The Chief Justice heads the third branch of our Government. He heads
the judicial conference of the United States, composed of all Federal
judges. He appoints committees which make policy for our federal
courts. He chairs the board of the Federal Judicial Center, which does
research, training, and education for our Federal courts. He literally
manages the Supreme Court.
He presides over the Court sessions and decisionmaking meetings of the
Court.
When he is in the majority he assigns opinions to the Justice who is to
write them.
The Chief Justice serves as a symbolic head of the Federal court system.
He holds the highest judicial office in our Nation. This is more than an-
other judicial appointment.
28
He occupies the pinnacle ofjudicial power in our country.
There are several ways that the Chief Justice can affect the direction
of the Court and influence its members. Not only does the Chief Jus-
tice, when in the majority, determine who among his colleagues will
author the Court's opinion,' 9 but he also "is expected to retain for
himself some opinions that he regards as of great significance.2 0
Certainly, Chief Justice Rehnquist did pen a number of his era's most
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
27 See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. 22,795 (1986) (statement of Sen. Biden) (referring to the Chief
Justice as "the second most important person in America, heading one of the three co-
equal branches of the Government").
28 Id. at 22,805 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
29 See id. at 22,811 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (recognizing that "[t]he role of assign-
ing opinions gives the chief power over the other Justices, whose place in history once
they ascend the Court is determined by when and what they write" (quoting Herman
Schwartz, Chief Rehnquist?, 243 NATION 236, 236 (1986))).
30 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 297 (1987).
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significant opinions, l or was among the majority in such cases, in-
32cluding a number of important pollution control cases.
In addition to the varied powers described above,3 the Chief Jus-
tice also has significant say concerning the very cases that the Court
will consider by deciding which, out of the thousands of petitions re-
ceived by the Court each year, will be the few petitions for certiorari
that the Justices discuss at their weekly conferences while the Court is
in session.34 Those cert petitions that are neither selected nor dis-
cussed are consequently denied, thereby upholding the determina-
tion by the courts below. 3 5 Lastly, the Chief Justice holds a uniquely
important symbolic position in our nation as well:
The Chief Justice not only serves longer than any President, but he and
his colleagues exercise power limited only by their consciences and prin-
ciples. The Chief stands as a metaphor for justice in our society more
than any other individual, including the President of the United States of
31 See generally, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (invali-
dating the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 for want of proper Commerce Clause au-
thority); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes
against states to enforce legislation enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
32 See generally, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (ruling that the
EPA may only consider public health and safety in setting ambient air quality standards
and not use a cost-benefit analysis); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to sue, merely by
alleging harm to the "aesthetic and recreational values of the area"); United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (providing a framework for limiting the responsibility of a
corporate parent for damages incurred by a polluting subsidiary); PUD No. 1 ofJefferson
County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) (authorizing states to impose con-
ditions on water quality certifications under the CWA); City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def.
Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994) (overruling the EPA's interpretation of the RCRA and holding
that the ash resulting from the incineration of municipal waste, if itself characteristically
hazardous, must also be treated as hazardous waste); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91
(1992) (ruling that the water quality laws of the downstream state must be met by the up-
stream state at the state line). He wrote the majority opinion in Solid Waste Agency of North
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), dis-
cussed in Part II.A infra. In SWANCC, the Court discussed the extent of federal jurisdic-
tion under section 404(a) of the CWA.
33 See, e.g., Ruger, supra note 25, at 350 ("[T]he Supreme Court's adjudicative function does
not capture exclusively, or even primarily, the full extent of the modem Chief Justice's
power. Much of the Chief's unique authority is administrative and bureaucratic, and in-
cludes the particular appointment power discussed here as well as other important roles,
such as presiding over the Federal Judicial Conference.").
34 REHNQUIST, supra note 30, at 253-54. After reviewing the list of petitions for certiorari
that the Chief Justice has selected, the Associate Justices may also have other petitions
added for consideration at conference. Id. at 265.
35 Id.
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America, or any U.S. Senator or Congressman. The Chief symbolizes the
guarantee of equal protection under law, "equal justice under the law,"
for all Americans. And that is not just an arcane legalism. It is the em-
bodiment of the fundamental purpose of our entire judicial system.'
6
The Chief Justice is more than simply the "first among equals"' 7 and
does wield power over colleagues, the Court's direction and docket,
the lower federal courts, and, of course, over Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch through the Court's authority to "say what the law
is.',,3 William H. Rehnquist, by virtue of his position as Chief Justice,
if for no other reason than he wielded the power to assign opinions
when in the majority and set the agenda for the Court's weekly con-
ferences, undoubtedly had a degree of significant influence over the
Court's direction. The influence he wielded over the direction of the
Court and his colleagues is, in fact, demonstrably illustrated by the
rebirth of federalism that occurred once he became ChiefJustice and
stands as one of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court.39
C. The End of an Era
While the era of the Rehnquist Court ended with Rehnquist's
death on September 3, 2005,4o given the confluence of the federaliza-
tion of environmental law and his leading the Court for almost twenty
years as Chief Justice, the legacy of the Rehnquist Court's impact on
environmental law and its development will undoubtedly leave its
mark on the Court. The precedent and approach to deciding envi-
ronmental cases established by the Rehnquist Court will guide and
inform the hand of future Supreme Courts, including the John Rob-
erts-led Supreme Court, as it faces the challenges attendant to cases
that arise under the various federal environmental statutes, including
the pollution control statutes.'
36 See 132 CONG. REc. 22,797 (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden).
37 Id. at 22,799 (statement of Sen. Biden).
38 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
39 See infra Part I.
40 E.g., Greenhouse, supra note 10, at 38.
41 In its first two Terms with John Roberts as Chief Justice, the Court has accepted several
cases arising under pollution control statutes for review: Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (ESA); United States v. Ad. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007)
(CERCLA); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (CAA); Envtl. Def. v. Duke En-
ergy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007) (CAA); Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208
(2006) (CAA).
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I. THE LEGACY OF THE REHNQUIST COURT: THE ALLOCATION OF
POWER BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE STATES
A. The Renewal of Federalism
Too little time has passed for scholars and others to fully compre-
hend the overall historical significance of the Rehnquist Court, but
decisions including United States v. Morrison,
42 Printz v. United States,43
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,4 United States v. Lopez, 45 and New York
v. United States46 demonstrate that federalism, 47 after an absence of
several decades, reemerged as a powerful constitutional doctrine in
the Court during Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice. 4s By providing
federalism with a new life under his leadership, the Rehnquist-led
Court established that there were indeed several near-forgotten con-
stitutional limitations on the legislative power of Congress.
Once William H. Rehnquist ascended to Chief Justice, the new
vigor that federalism enjoyed was perhaps predictable, if one looked
to his dissent as an Associate Justice in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority." He asserted his strongly held federalism beliefs
42 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
43 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
44 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
45 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
46 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
47 The term "federalism" is not capable of precise summary, but suffice it to say that federal-
ism essentially involves the balance of power between the federal and state governments.
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994)
(describing federalism as the division of power "between central and subordinate authori-
ties").
48 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 1 (2004) ("When his-
torians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt they will say that its greatest
changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism."); see also Scott Fruehwald,
The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Moderate Con-
stitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REv. 289, 290 (2003) ("Verti-
cal federalism has been a major concern of the Rehnquist Court. In a series of cases, the
Court has protected states' rights from imposition by the federal government."); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 569, 570 (2003) (noting that the "second" Rehnquist Court focused increasingly on
federalism issues beginning in the October 2004 Term); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Envi-
ronmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81
MINN. L. REv. 97, 154 (1996) ("Conservatives on the Court, led by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, have excoriated their brethren to protect state and local governments against
excessive intrusions by a federal government ineffectively constrained via the political
process."). For a harsh critique of the Rehnquist Court, suggesting that the rebirth of
federalism was nothing more than "camouflage for states stepping on people's rights,"
see GARBUS, supra note 1, at 121.
49 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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in Garcia, while vehemently disagreeing with the majority for overrul-
ing National League of Cites v. Usery,5' which only a few years earlier had
held that the enforcement against the states of the minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor and Standards Act "in areas
of traditional governmental functions" was beyond the scope of pow-
ers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause. 51 Demonstrat-
ing the utmost self-assurance in his federalism convictions, as well as
predicting the not-too-distant future direction of the Court,
Rehnquist wrote:
National League of Cities... recognized that Congress could not act under
its commerce power to infringe on certain fundamental aspects of state
sovereignty .... I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to
spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in
52time again command the support of a majority of this Court.
He thus foreshadowed in his dissent what would become a hallmark
of the Court under his guidance as Chief Justice-namely, that the
Court would not hesitate to assert its constitutional authority as a co-
equal branch of government readily standing by to serve as a check
on the power Congress asserted against the states and their citizens.
In his other writings, too, Chief Justice Rehnquist certainly recog-
nized the role of the federal courts and their place in our tripartite
system of federal government as a powerful check on the actions of
Congress. In discussing the lack of power that the courts in Britain
had at the time our republic was founded, he noted:
But the framers of the United States Constitution quite clearly had in
mind something different from the British system: They wanted the
judges to be independent of the president and of Congress, but in all
probability they also wanted the federal courts to be able to pass on
whether or not legislation enacted by Congress was consistent with the
limitations of the United States Constitution.
50 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
51 Id. at 852.
52 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In another dissent written while an
Associate Justice, Rehnquist also made plain his belief in federalism and the role of the
federal courts as a limit on national power. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553
(1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In this case... the State is not simply asserting an ab-
sence of congressional legislative authority, but rather is asserting an affirmative constitu-
tional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally as-
serted authority.").
53 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 197 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) ("The most dra-
matic area of change in the law during the Rehnquist Court has been in the protection of
federalism. Indeed, the Court has shown little deference to Congress in matters of feder-
alism and has aggressively protected the states from perceived federal encroachment.").
54 REHNQUIST, supra note 30, at 306.
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He further wrote that:
The framers of our system of government may indeed have built perhaps
better than they knew. They wanted a Constitution that would check the
excesses of majority rule, and they created an institution to enforce the
commands of the Constitution.... Two hundred years of experience
now tell us that they succeeded to an extraordinary degree in accom-
plishing their purpose. We cannot know for certain the sort of issues
with which the Court will grapple in the third century of its existence.
But there is no reason to doubt that it will continue as a vital and
uniquely American institutional participant in the everlasting search of
civilized society for the proper balance between liberty and authority, be-
tween the state and the individual. 5
Having expressed these views in his book The Supreme Court: How It
Was, How It Is, which was published shortly after he became ChiefJus-
tice, the role Rehnquist recognized for a proactive Judicial Branch,
which decided "whether or not legislation enacted by Congress was
consistent with the limitations of the United States Constitution," was
a role pursued by the Rehnquist Court with a new vigor unseen for
decades in the Supreme Court.
5 6
B. An Overview of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism and the Implications for
the Pollution Control Statutes
The revitalization of federalism by the Rehnquist Court, although
perhaps predictable, was nonetheless surprising because the concept
that there were truly enforceable constitutional limits on congres-
sional power with respect to economic regulation was widely viewed
as having been resolved many decades ago by the Supreme Court
during the period of New Deal legislation.5 7 As a result of the evolu-
tion of cases challenging Depression-era congressional action taken
in the pursuit of President Franklin Roosevelt's legislative agenda, it
was long accepted constitutional doctrine that there were in effect
55 Id. at 319.
56 See, e.g., KECK, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that the "Rehnquist Court has been the least
deferential of any in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, striking down thirty provi-
sions of federal law from 1995 to 2001," concluding that these statutes "just ten years ago,
would have been deemed perfectly constitutional without any serious question").
57 See generally, e.g., 'ickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to the production and consumption of homegrown
wheat neither sold nor purchased in interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act under the Commerce Clause);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (affirming Congress's Com-
merce Clause power to authorize the NLRB to enjoin unfair labor practices); W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state minimum wages for women
and children against a due process challenge).
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few, if any, actual limits on congressional action involving economic
regulation, so long as such action rested upon a rational basis.58
Through its revitalization of federalism as a viable constitutional doc-
trine, the Rehnquist Court challenged this many-decades-old, con-
ventionally accepted wisdom.
The constitutional sources of the limitations on congressional
power recognized by the rebirth of federalism in the Rehnquist Court
included the Commerce Clause,5 9 Tenth Amendment,w and Eleventh
Amendment. 6' The Court's newfound appreciation of federalism
through each of these constitutional sources raised questions about
the direction of the Court and, of particular relevance to this Article,
concerns about the impact the reemergence of federalism could have
on the validity of the pollution control statutes enacted by Congress."
58 See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981) ("A court may invalidate legisla-
tion enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis
for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that
there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the as-
serted ends" (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258, 262 (1964)).
59 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 17, at 1165 (explaining that the Rehnquist Court is "rethink-
ing basic principles of federalism, which ultimately could limit federal authority to pro-
tect the environment"); Revesz, supra note 17, at 558 (noting that the "Supreme Court's
recent federalism jurisprudence is likely to constrain the federal government's regulatory
authority"); Jamie Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal Environmental
Law Survive in the Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1051, 1053 (2001)
("In the past decade, however, the Supreme Court has taken a closer look at Congress's
exercise of its Commerce Clause power and has invalidated several federal laws for violat-
ing basic principles of federalism.").
60 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2205 (1998) (noting that the effect of the Printz decision on the
validity of a range of statutes, including several environmental statutes, was unclear).
61 The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity.., against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
62 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Friends of Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 167, 182 (2001) ("[E]nvironmental regulation may no longer be immune from the
sweep of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence .... ."); RichardJ. Lazarus, Essay, Judging En-
vironmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 214 (2004) (noting that the Court's recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is "casting doubt on a broad reading of the jurisdic-
tional reach of federal environmental statutes such as the CWA and, for some lower court
judges, on the ESA as well" (footnote omitted)).
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1. The Commerce Clause
It took barely a decade for the shift to occur that then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist predicted in his Garcia dissent, and for a majority of
the Court to join his view that there were indeed enforceable limits
beyond the rational basis test for congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. With the Court's decision in United States v. Lo-
pez,65 Rehnquist's dissent in Garcia proved prescient. Assuming the
responsibility for drafting the majority opinion in Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist considered the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, in
which "Congress made it a federal offense 'for any individual know-
ingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."'' The Court held that
this Act was beyond the scope of powers provided to Congress under
the Commerce Clause. 65 Lopez was a remarkable decision because the
last time the Supreme Court used the Commerce Clause to invalidate
an act of Congress was 1936.66
Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly established the foundation for his
Commerce Clause position in Lopez by quoting James Madison from
The Federalist "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to re-
main in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." 67
Rehnquist then went on to examine the nature of the power histori-
cally delegated to Congress under the Commerce Clause, and he
found that Congress could regulate three types of activities:
"First... the use of the channels of interstate commerce .... Sec-
ond... the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce .... Finally ... those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce ....68
63 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
64 Id. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1988)).
65 Id. at 561.
66 See, e.g., DAVID L. HUDSON,JR., THE REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND
LEGACY 60 (2007) ("The Lopez decision was a watershed as it was the first time in more
than 60 years that the Court had invalidated a federal law as exceeding Congress's com-
merce clause powers."); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez,
1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 128 n.9 (noting that, prior to Lopez, the last time the Court had
struck down an act of Congress under the Commerce Clause was in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936), where the Court invalidated a statute regulating unfair
labor practices in the coal industry).
67 Lopez., 514 U.S. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
23, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
68 Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
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In light of those three categories of economic activities that Con-
gress could regulate under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
was an effort by Congress to regulate within the third category.69
Then, in considering the merits of the statute, the majority, by a vote
of five to four, found that the statute was "a criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic en-
terprise, however broadly one might define those terms," and for the
first time since the New Deal the Supreme Court held that a statute
was beyond the Commerce Clause powers granted to Congress.7 °
Lopez caused immediate concern regarding the scope of its hold-
ing.7' With respect to the pollution control statutes in particular,
questions arose as to whether Congress had the constitutional basis to
establish and impose upon the states a federal environmental protec-
tion program, given Congress could not enact legislation to address
situations where:
[F]our percent of American high school students (and six percent of in-
ner-city high school students) carry a gun to school at least occasion-
ally... 12 percent of urban high school students have had guns fired at
them... 20 percent of those students have been threatened with guns,
and.., in any 6-month period, several hundred thousand schoolchildren
are victims of violent crimes in or near their schools.72
Thus, concerns were heightened following Lopez that the entire infra-
structure of federal environmental protection was vulnerable to
Commerce Clause challenges, since Congress was powerless under
the Commerce Clause to regulate guns near schools, despite the
abundant evidence of the prevalence of guns and gun violence at or
near schools.75
69 See id. at 559.
70 Id. at 561.
71 Id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that one of the problems with the majority's
holding "is that it threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case,
seemed reasonably well settled").
72 Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
73 See, e.g., Michel C. Doff, The Good Society, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2161, 2184 (2001) (finding that the decisions in Lopez and Morrison "threaten[] fed-
eral regulatory competence in areas of clear national importance--such as environmental
protection").
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2. The Tenth Amendment
The Rehnquist-led Court also expanded the reach of federalism
through the use of the Tenth Amendment74 as another means to es-
tablish that the Court was poised to assert its authority to protect
states from what it believed were unwarranted intrusions by Congress
upon the states as separate sovereigns. Printz v. United States75 illus-
trates this aspect of the Rehnquist Court's newfound federalism,
where local law enforcement officials claimed that certain Brady
Handgun Violence Protection Act 76 provisions violated the Tenth
Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the
statute "purports to direct state law enforcement officers to partici-
pate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally en-
acted regulatory scheme."' 7  As such, he concluded that the chal-
lenged provisions of the Brady Act were an unconstitutional
"[flederal commandeering" that violated the Tenth Amendment by
requiring state officials to implement a federal program. 7s  Paying
special reverence to the sovereignty of the states, Justice Scalia recog-
nized:
It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they re-
main independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of au-
thority. It is no more compatible with this independence and autonomy
that their officers be 'dragooned' . . . into administering federal law, than
it would be compatible with the independence and autonomy of the
United States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution
of state laws. 79
Although Printz struck down a law not even remotely related to the
pollution control statutes, a discussion of particular importance to
74 The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
75 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
76 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. V 1998).
77 Printz, 521 U.S. at 904. For a critique of Justice Scalia's approach in Printz, see Jackson,
supra note 59, at 2181 (arguing in part that the Printz holding has little support as a mat-
ter of constitutional history).
78 Printz, 521 U.S. at 925. In finding a constitutional violation, the Court relied heavily on
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which invalidated a provision of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which required states to either
adopt legislation regulating the disposal of radioactive waste generated within a state, or,
in the absence of state regulations, to take title to the radioactive waste, holding that such
a provision was an attempt to "compel the States to enact or administer a federal regula-
tory program." Id. at 188.
79 Id. at 928 (citations omitted).
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the federal environmental regulatory scheme was included in the ma-
jority opinion where Justice Scalia observed that:
Federal commandeering of state governments is such a novel phenome-
non that this Court's first experience with it did not occur until the
1970's, when the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regula-
tions requiring States to prescribe auto emissions testing, monitoring and
retrofit programs, and to designate preferential bus and carpool lanes.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits invalidated the
regulations on statutory grounds in order to avoid what they perceived to
be grave constitutional issues; and the District of Columbia Circuit in-
validated the regulations on both constitutional and statutory grounds.
After we granted certiorari to review the statutory and constitutional va-
lidity of the regulations, the Government declined even to defend them,
and instead rescinded some and conceded the invalidity of those that
remained .... [L]ater opinions of ours have made clear that the Federal
Government may not compel the States to im0Plement, by legislation or
executive action, federal regulatory 
programs.
Following so closely on the heels of Lopez, Justice Scalia's discus-
sion in Printz of the early constitutional challenges faced by certain
post-CAA regulations adopted by the EPA raised additional concerns
about the viability of at least some of the pollution control statutes
under the Court's expanding federalism jurisprudence." After Printz,
were there valid arguments under the Tenth Amendment that part or
all of the pollution control statutes, with their heavy reliance on co-
operative federalism, amounted to a prohibited commandeering of
the states to implement a federal environmental regulatory program?
By specifically referring to the prior constitutional threats to EPA air
pollution control regulations, was Justice Scalia signaling that the
Court might provide a receptive audience to renewed challenges to
certain environmental statutes or regulations based on Printz? Just
how far would the Court go if presented with an argument that par-
ticular environmental statutes violated the Tenth Amendment?
Given such uncertainties attendant to the revitalization of federalism,
Printz served to further heighten concerns that federalism under the
Rehnquist Court was growing in scope and might serve as the basis to
attack at least portions of the federal environmental regulatory
scheme.
80 Id. at 925 (citations omitted).
81 See id. at 960-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the majority opinion could
lead to the invalidation of pollution control statutes, including the CWA and RCRA).
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3. The Eleventh Amendment
The emergence of federalism under the Rehnquist Court was also
given sustenance under the Eleventh Amendment as seen in Seminole
82
Tribe of Florida v. Florida. Here, the statute in question was a provi-
sion of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which expressly
authorized tribes to file suit in federal court if a tribe believed that a
state was not negotiating in good faith toward the formation of a
compact allowing gaming on Indian lands.s3 The Seminole Tribe
filed such a suit against Florida, and the Eleventh Circuit determined
that the tribe's suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment's grant of
sovereign immunity to the states, notwithstanding the express abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity by Congress in the statute. 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing yet again for the majority in a
sharply divided Court on another important federalism question, af-
firmed that the Eleventh Amendment served to bar the Seminole
Tribe's suit. In strong terms, he made it plain that "[e]ven when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a
particular area"-here the regulation of commerce with Indian tribes
under the Indian Commerce Clause-"the Eleventh Amendment pre-
vents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States.
8 5
As a result of the decisions by the Rehnquist Court in cases includ-
ing Lopez, Printz, and Seminole Tribe,8 6 growing unease surrounded the
breadth of the Rehnquist Court's federalism, including what it could
mean for the pollution control statutes and the other federal statutes
geared towards protecting the environment.8 7 Undoubtedly, this ap-
prehension concerning how far the Rehnquist Court would extend its
82 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
83 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (1994).
84 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994).
85 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. The Court also found that the doctrine allowing suits in
federal court against state officials to enjoin further violations of federal law espoused in
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), did not provide an alternate basis to support the
Seminole Tribe's suit. See id. at 73-76.
86 One aspect important in terms of the pollution control statutes is that Seminole Tribe ex-
pressly overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), where only five years pre-
viously, the Court had found that private parties could sue states under CERCLA, as Con-
gress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under its Commerce Clause power.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. This aspect of the Seminole Tribe decision is discussed in Part
IC, infra.
87 See supra note 59.
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newfound federalism lent support to the proposition that the Court
during this time was anti-environmental and pro-business.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE POLLUTION CONTROL CASES
Given that one of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court was the
revitalization of federalism as a means to limit congressional action
and to allocate power between the federal government and the states,
88 The politics in existence during the Rehnquist era no doubt added to the perception that
the Rehnquist Court was part of a federal government that had turned anti-
environmental and pro-business. William Rehnquist was initially nominated to the Court
by Republican President Richard Nixon, and was nominated for Chief Justice by yet an-
other Republican President, Ronald Reagan. Rehnquist had served as Chief Justice for
several years when the Republicans ultimately won majorities in both houses of Congress
and proposed the party's "Contract with America," which, among other government re-
forms, focused on reducing regulations that were perceived as making businesses less
competitive and more costly. SeeJohn H. Cushman Jr., Republicans Plan Sweeping Barriers
to New US. Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1994, at 1 (reporting that pursuant to the Contract
with America, the newly elected Republican House majority planned to adopt legislation
that would dramatically reduce the costs to business of complying with federal regula-
tions). This directly implicated federal environmental regulatory programs, raising con-
cerns that the Republican-led Congress would roll back decades of environmental protec-
tion. See id. (noting that action taken to further the goals of the Contract with America
"would fundamentally alter the workings of agencies like the Environmental Protection
Agency"). It was also during the era of the Rehnquist Court that another Republican was
elected President, George W. Bush, with the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000), contributing to his election. The second President Bush almost in-
stantaneously achieved a reputation as leading a pro-business, anti-environmental ad-
ministration. See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy
Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 363 (2004) ("My view is that this admini-
stration has compiled the worst environmental record of any administration in history.");
John Bacon & Traci Watson, Report: EPA Plans to Ease Pollution Limits, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec.
21, 2001, at A3 ("The Environmental Protection Agency is close to allowing scores of the
nation's oldest power plants and oil refineries to emit more air pollution .... The Bush
Administration claim[s] the regulation prevents refineries and power plants from doing
routine maintenance."); Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules: How the Bush Administration
Quietly-and Radically-Transformed the Nation's Clean-Air Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004,
§6 (Magazine), at 38, 40 (asserting that while the Bush Administration redefined federal
environmental laws, "[o]verturning new-source review.., represents the most sweeping
change, and among the least noticed"); David L. Greene, Bush Expected to Weaken Portions
of Clean Air Act: Issue Revisited Amid High Approval Rating, BALT. SUN, Dec. 23, 2001, at IA
("President Bush has argued that some Clean Air Act rules stifle energy output and do lit-
te to protect the environment"); David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact
on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 2001, at Al (reporting that President Bush "tacitly
acknowledged that the United States' rejection of the Kyoto accord had estranged the
United States from many nations with which it has good relations generally"); Katharine
Q. Seelye, Bush Team Is Reversing Environmental Polices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at A20
(noting that the "Bush Administration has proceeded with several regulations, legal set-
tlements and legislative measures intended to reverse Clinton-era environmental poli-
cies").
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how did this feature of the Rehnquist Court affect its decision making
in the pollution control cases? If the Court under Chief Justice
Rehnquist was plainly anti-environmental and pro-business, as a
number of commentators have concluded, 9 then we should expect to
find cases where the Court used federalism to invalidate pollution
control statutes or regulations of the EPA. After all, the Rehnquist
Court's decision in Lopez "ushered in a new era in which federal stat-
utes fell at an amazing rate."9 It turns out, however, that instead of
using federalism to strike down provisions of the pollution control
statutes or EPA regulatory efforts, as some feared would occur with
the revitalization of federalism, not a single provision of a pollution
control statute or regulation was struck down on federalism grounds
by the Rehnquist Court.9
A. SWANCC
The clearest example where a pollution control statute survived a
federalism challenge, specifically a Commerce Clause challenge, is
seen in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
92Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), where the Court considered whether
the so-called Migratory Bird Rule93 allowed the Army Corps of Engi-
neers ("the Corps") to assert jurisdiction under section 404(a) of the
CWA94 over wetlands that were located wholly intrastate or isolated
95from interstate waters. The wetlands in dispute were located at a
former sand and gravel pit that the Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County (SWANCC) had acquired for a regional nonhazardous
89 See supra note 2.
90 HUDSON, supra note 66, at 60.
91 Admittedly, the Rehnquist Court did strike down on federalism grounds portions of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992), as incompatible with the Tenth Amendment. The statute at issue in
that case, however, is not one of the traditional pollution control statutes. As such, the
decision in New York v. United States has been inconsequential in terms of traditional envi-
ronmental regulation. Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Envi-
ronmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENvTL. L. 809, 841 (2002).
92 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
93 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). In sum, the Migratory Bird Rule provides
that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to intrastate waters which, among other things,
(1) "would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties," or (2)
"would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines...." See
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217).
94 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). Section 404(a) authorizes the Corps to issue permits before
the dredging or filling of a wetland can occur.
95 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162.
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solid waste landfill. 96  After initially declining to assert jurisdiction,
the Corps reconsidered and ultimately claimed jurisdiction. The
Corps refused to issue the section 404(a) permit required for the
landfill project, despite the fact that it had been fully approved and
permitted by state and local agencies, including the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Illinois Department of Conservation,
Cook County, and the Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals.97
Indeed, the State of Illinois in its Solid Waste Management Act
recognized that landfills "continue to be necessary," that "landfill ca-
pacity is decreasing," and that addressing this dwindling capacity was
"very difficult due to the public concern and competition with other
land uses."9 Yet, despite this express recognition of competing land
uses as a concern to Illinois and its desire to address the projected
diminishing landfill capacity with projects such as the one at issue in
SWANCC, the federal government did not oblige; instead, the Corps
relied on the Migratory Bird Rule to prohibit a local agency repre-
senting twenty-three suburban municipalities from developing a land-
fill responsive to the solid waste disposal needs of 700,000 local citi-
zens within those municipalities." Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
writing for the majority in SWANCC, held that the Migratory Bird
Rule was not entitled to Chevron deference,'0° and was beyond the
grant of authority conferred to the Corps by Congress under section
404(a) of the CWA.''
Important to the reasoning of Chief Justice Rehnquist in finding
that the Corps lacked jurisdiction was the fact that, in his view, to ex-
96 Id. at 162-63.
97 Id. at 164-65. In denying the permit, the Corps found the following: (1) SWANCC failed
to demonstrate that the proposed use was the "least environmentally damaging, most
practicable alternative"; (2) the project presented a risk to drinking water supplies; and
(3) the project's impact on local wildlife was not subject to mitigation because the landfill
could not later be developed into a forested habitat. Id. at 165 (citation omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). It should also be pointed out that SWANCC was well
aware of the impact that the project could have on the wildlife that inhabited the aban-
doned sand and gravel quarry. In an effort to mitigate the impact, the agency had agreed
to expend more than $17 million to, among other things, create 17.6 acres of replace-
ment wetlands, relocate a heron rookery, phase all construction over a fifteen-year pe-
riod to minimize impact, and acquire 258 acres adjacent to the site for a forested habitat.
Id. at 165; Brief for the Petitioner at 5, SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (No. 99-1178), 2000 WL
1041190.
98 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 97, at 3 n.2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Illinois Solid Waste Management Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/2-2(a)(2), (3), (10)(b)
(1998)).
99 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 97, at 2-3; see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-65.
100 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
101 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172, 174.
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tend the Corps jurisdiction to isolated, wholly intrastate wetlands
through the Migratory Bird Rule "would result in a significant im-
pingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and
water use." 0 2  Chief Justice Rehnquist found that in enacting the
CWA, Congress did not choose to readjust the traditional federal-
state balance, where matters are left to state regulation; instead,
"Congress chose to 'recognize, preserve, and protect the primary re-
sponsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, [and] to plan the development and use... of land and wa-
ter resources . ,,,103 The attempt by the Corps to claim jurisdiction
over a wholly intrastate wetlands site was, according to Rehnquist,
simply inconsistent with this express congressional recognition in the
CWA.
The SWANCC decision was assailed by many as reflective of the
anti-environmental nature of the Rehnquist Court because the opin-
ion was viewed as significantly lessening the protections afforded to
wetlands, since the majority opinion by Rehnquist struck down the
Migratory Bird Rule and thereby served to limit the jurisdiction of the
Corps. 104  One commentator stated, for example, that
"[e]nvironmentalists are no strangers to disappointment in the U.S.
Supreme Court, but [SWANCC] is particularly disappointing. First, it
might be said that the impact of the opinion... may be the most
devastating judicial opinion affecting the environment ever."
'
1
5
To reach the conclusion, though, that SWANCC demonstrates that
the Court under Rehnquist's leadership was anti-environmental sim-
102 Id. at 174.
103 Id. at 166-67 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)). In ruling against the Corps, Chief Justice
Rehnquist also considered the fact that the Corps's assertion of expansive jurisdiction was
inconsistent with its previous interpretations after the CWA's enactment. Initially, the
Corps recognized that a "water body's capability of use by the public for purposes of
transportation or commerce" was "the determinative factor" in establishing jurisdiction
under section 404(a) of the Clean water Act. Id. at 168 (quoting 33 C.F.R.
§ 209.260(e) (1) (1974)). In SWANCC, the wetlands located at the isolated, abandoned
sand-and-gravel quarry were not capable of public use for transportation or commerce,
and there was "no persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook Congress' intent in 1974."
Id. at 168.
104 See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC, [2001]
31 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10669, 10669 ("Critics of the SWANCC decision argued
that it jeopardizes 'perhaps a fifth of the water bodies in the United States.'"); John D.
Ostergren, Note, SWANCC in Duck County: Will Court-Ordered Devolution Fill the Prairie
Potholes?, 22 STA,. ETVL. L.J. 381, 386 (2003) (asserting that SWANCC results in a "grave
threat" to the wetlands and waterfowl of the Great Plains states).
105 William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond,
[2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) at 10741, 10741 (footnote omitted).
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ply misses the mark for at least two reasons. One reason why the
SWANCC opinion does not serve to establish that the Rehnquist
Court was an anti-environmental Court is because of the action that
the Court did not take in deciding the case. Since SWANCC was pend-
ing before the Court well after the groundbreaking Commerce
Clause Lopez and Morrison cases had been decided, the petitioner was
certainly well aware of the renewed vigor federalism enjoyed under
the Rehnquist Court and its use on multiple occasions to curb what
was viewed as overreaching by the federal government. In recogni-
tion of the Court's newfound federalism, the petitioner in SWANCC
asserted in its opening brief that:
The question in this case is whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers exceeded
the bounds of its authority under the Clean Water Act or the Commerce Clause
when it asserted jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, water-filled trenches
and depressions on SWANCC's land solely because those waters were
habitat for migratory birds. "'
The petitioner was even more pointed in its reply brief on the Com-
merce Clause issue:
By claiming to have jurisdiction over isolated, mainly seasonal ponds on
SWANCC's land because migratory birds use them, the Corps obliterates
the distinction between what is national and what is local. If federal au-
thority reaches all water and wetlands used by Canada geese, mallard
ducks, and other migratory birds, there is nothing to prevent the federal
government from regulating every tree in which migratory birds roost
and every lawn on which they feed.... On the Corps' theory of the com-
merce power, no non-commercial activity is beyond federal authority, for
nothing is so far removed from interstate commerce that it cannot be
linked to it in some fashion."0 7
The Commerce Clause argument presented by the petitioner in
SWANCC certainly could have found a sympathetic majority in light of
the Rehnquist Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist did recognize in SWANCC that the petitioner's argu-
ment raised "significant constitutional and federalism questions."18
But the Chief Justice, while recognizing the importance of the Com-
merce Clause issues presented in SWANCC, ultimately concluded that
the statute did not provide the Corps with jurisdiction over the iso-
lated wetlands in question, and thus exercised judicial restraint to
avoid deciding the merits of the Commerce Clause argument out of
106 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 97, at 11 (emphasis added).
107 Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1, SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (No. 99-1178), 2000 WIL
1532361 (citations omitted).
108 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
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the Court's "prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional
issues." 09
If the Rehnquist Court were truly an anti-environmental court and
hostile to environmental causes, one would think that it would have
accepted the express invitation by the petitioner in SWANCC to rule on
the Commerce Clause question. The Court could have used the case to
broaden once again the reach of the Court's federalism jurispru-
dence by holding that the assertion of jurisdiction by the Corps, or
perhaps even section 404(a) itself, was invalid under the Commerce
Clause. This result would have called into question not just section
404(a), but other sections of the statute as well, and conceivably the
entire federal regime of environmental protection. By exercising ju-
dicial restraint, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist instead declined to
accept the invitation to rule on the Commerce Clause question, and
thus did not utilize SWANCC as an opportunity to expand the Court's
federalism jurisprudence by using the Commerce Clause as a re-
straint on federal authority under the CWA. With the exception of
the Migratory Bird Rule, the Court's decision in SWANCC left the ex-
tensive reach of the Corps' jurisdiction over navigable waters intact,
which is far from the act of an anti-environmental Supreme Court.
Pointing to SWANCC as evidence of the Rehnquist Court's anti-
environmental persuasion also fails for a second reason: such a view-
point misapprehends section 404(a) as conferring substantial federal
protection over wetlands. That is in fact not what section 404(a)
achieves. Section 404 of the CWA is ascribed too much weight as an
environmental protection provision. Instead, it is more accurately
described as an environmental permitting provision, which allows
applicants to obtain individual permits. Once issued, these permits
allow the filling of the wetland described in the permit applications,
or, alternatively, authorize, under a nationwide permitting system,
the filling of wetlands associated with a wide range of specified, com-
monly encountered development-related activities. " ° Certainly, the
109 Id. at 172.
110 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). Section 404(a) authorizes the issuance of permits to "discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." Id.
§ 1344(a). In addition to individual permits, the Corps is also authorized to issue nation-
wide permits as a matter of administrative convenience, which allows the filling of wet-
lands in association with certain commonly encountered activities that "will cause only
minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment." Id. § 1344(e)(1). A number of
activities are covered by nationwide permits and, to name but a few, include the place-
ment of navigation aids, outfall construction and maintenance, construction and repair
of utility lines and associated structures, bank stabilization projects, and the construction
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Corps can deny the sought-after individual permit, as it did in
SWANCC, or the EPA may object to the issuance of a permit by the
Corps authorizing the filling of wetlands,"1 but permit denials by the
Corps or permit objections by the EPA are, by far, the exception
rather than the rule. Those who point to SWANCC as a decision that
resulted in substantial environmental harm by excluding wholly intra-
state wetlands from federal protection ignore that, in practice, and by
an overwhelming margin, the Corps regularly authorizes under sec-
tion 404(a) the filling of wetlands. 2 The undeniable fact is that the
Corps routinely grants individual permits to discharge dredged or fill
material into wetlands, which calls into question any increased ad-
verse environmental impact arising from the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in SWANCC, along with the very premise of section 404(a) as pro-
viding any significant, meaningful level of federal protection for
wetlands beyond requiring permits prior to dredging or filling.
What the Court's opinion in SWANCC did accomplish was to pre-
serve section 404(a) from an attack on Commerce Clause grounds
and to protect the balance between federal regulation of interstate
wetlands and state control over wholly intrastate wetlands.13  It does
not follow, though, that because wholly intrastate wetlands are no
longer subject to federal jurisdiction, they are completely devoid of
environmental regulation. What SWANCC, in essence, concluded was
of single-family homes. Issuance of Nationwide Permits, Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2029-
35, 2046 (Jan. 15, 2002). Each nationwide permit is subject to specific terms and condi-
tions, as well as to general terms and conditions. Id. at 2020.
111 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (allowing the EPA to object to the "specification... of any de-
fined area as a disposal site" for dredged or fill material).
112 Based on Corps data, the Corps denied less than one percent of individual permits dur-
ing fiscal year 2003. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
REGULATORY PROGRAM fig. 1 (2003), http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/
2003webcharts.pdf.
113 In fact, it is arguable whether the federal government programs administered through
the Corps are more effective at the preservation and protection of wetlands than were
previously existing state or local regulatory programs. See Jonathan H. Adler, Swamp
Rules: The End of Federal Wetland Regulation?, REG., Summer 1999, at 11, 13-14, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n2/swamprules.pdf (noting that well be-
fore the federal government's regulatory intervention through section 404, a number of
states were regulating and conserving wetlands). Professor Adler also contends that the
quality and importance of wetlands varies greatly within a region, and that as a result,
"[w]hich wetlands are vital to protect in a given area is information that is more readily
available at the state and local level." Id. at 14; see also Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State
Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 237, 244-46
(2000) (recognizing that the four benefits of state and local environmental regulation
compared with federal regulation include (1) more effective solutions to "place-specific"
environmental problems, (2) increased flexibility, (3) greater innovation, and (4) in-
creased responsiveness between state and local governments and their citizens).
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that wholly intrastate wetlands were not subject to federal-agency per-
mitting prior to the discharge of dredged or fill material, but are sub-
ject to the level of regulation deemed appropriate by state and local
governments. That is, the Court found that wetlands located wholly
intrastate were not subject to regulation under the Migratory Bird
Rule by a federal agency, but left the regulatory decision in the hands
of state and local governments, which as a matter of tradition have
always assumed responsibility within their borders for land use regu-
lation, planning, and development.1 1 4 This result is consistent with
the statutory scheme Congress established under the CWA as re-
flected in SWANCC. 1 1 5 This result is, of course, also entirely consistent
with the delicate balance of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments that underlies federalism, and, in particular, the coopera-
tive federalism of environmental protection. 
1 1 6
B. Bestfoods
Although not expressly involving a federalism challenge, another
example of the Rehnquist Court's willingness in a pollution control
case to protect states from federal intrusion in areas that are tradi-
tionally matters of state law is provided by United States v. Bestfoods, li
where the EPA sought to recover response costs incurred in the
cleanup of a former chemical production facility under CERCLA.
Due to the insolvency of the subsidiary that once owned and operated
the site, the EPA included among the defendants the one-time parent
corporation of the polluting subsidiary as a party to the CERCLA cost
recovery action. The competing issue of state and federal law that
arose was whether the traditional state law area of corporations
served to protect a parent corporation from the reach of CERCLA's
onerous strict liability scheme.1 "
114 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
115 Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) ("It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preserva-
tion, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administra-
tor in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.").
116 For a discussion of the local politics involved in the SWANCC case, see generally Thomas
W. Merrill, The Story of SWANCC: Federalism and the Politics of Locally Unwanted Land Uses,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 283-319 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds.,
2005). Ironically, after many years of litigation that ultimately secured the ability to con-
struct the landfill on the site, the property was sold to the State of Illinois and private de-
velopers for residential and industrial uses. Id. at 312-16.
117 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
118 Id. at 55, 60.
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Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Souter took note of the
fact that " [i] t is a general principle of corporate law deeply 'ingrained
in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation (so-
called because of control through ownership of another corpora-
tion's stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries." " 9 He went
on to write that "nothing in CERCLA purports to reject this bedrock
principle, and ... the congressional silence is audible."'' 0 The Court
consequently found that a parent corporation was not automatically
subject to CERCLA liability by virtue of the acts of its subsidiary.'
Does not the fact that the Court in Bestfoods construed CERCLA in
a manner that limited the ability of the EPA and the Department of
Justice to pursue parent corporations in cost recovery actions serve to
establish the anti-environmental, pro-business nature of the
Rehnquist Court? Indeed, one might argue that, by limiting the abil-
ity of the government to recover against the former parents of pollut-
ing subsidiaries, the substantial costs to remediate the contaminated
sites would fall upon the taxpayers, which is exactly the result one
would predict from a pro-business, anti-environmental Court.
Justice Souter, however, did not end his opinion for the Court
merely by finding that CERCLA could not impinge upon the tradi-
tional state corporate law doctrine of limited shareholder liability. If
he had done so, the case rightfully might be subject to criticism that it
was an anti-environmental, pro-business decision, leaving taxpayers
responsible for the substantial cleanup costs associated with contami-
nated property, while absolving parent corporations of any liability
under CERCLA. Importantly, despite the limited liability attendant
to shareholder status, Justice Souter proceeded to provide a blueprint
for how the EPA and the Department of Justice still could construct a
CERCLA case against a parent corporation to recoup the costs associ-
ated with contamination caused by a subsidiary's operations. It is be-
cause of this liability blueprint offered by the Court that Bestfoods is
not a decision by a Supreme Court that is anti-environmental and
pro-business, but reflects a Court that in Bestfoods essentially sought to
apply the "polluter pays" principle, while still protecting long-
119 Id. at 61 (quoting William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929)).
120 Id. at 62. This is a reflection of the long-recognized principle of shareholder limited li-
ability that is elementary to traditional corporate law. E.g., I WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 14 (rev. ed. 2006) ("[T] he
shareholders of a corporation are ordinarily not liable for the corporation's obligations,
liabilities, or debts.").
121 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-64.
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established state corporate law from intrusion by Congress through
CERCLA.
In particular, Justice Souter pointed out, for the convenience of
the EPA and the Department of Justice, that a parent corporation
could be liable under CERCLA for the costs to remediate contamina-
tion caused by a subsidiary under two situations. First, a parent could
incur CERCLA liability under the state corporate law doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil, 122 since "[n]othing in CERCLA purports
to rewrite this well-settled rule, either."'2 3 Second, as an alternative
liability theory for the EPA and the Department of Justice to pursue
against parent corporations, the Court also pointed out that "[u]nder
the plain language of the statute, any person who operates a pollut-
ing facility is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution.
This is so regardless of whether that person is the facility's owner, the
owner's parent corporation or business partner .... While not
deciding the ultimate question of the parent corporation's responsi-
bility under the liability blueprint set out in Bestfoods, the Court's
opinion nevertheless did note that, based upon the facts in the re-
cord, the parent corporation very well may have been liable for the
EPA's remediation costs, as an operator of the subsidiary's chemical
manufacturing plant. 1
25
One would simply not expect a Supreme Court that was purport-
edly, with respect to environmental cases, pro-business and anti-
environment, to provide in a unanimous opinion what amounted to a
litigation strategy for how the EPA and the Department of Justice
could recover the government's cleanup costs under section 107 of
CERCLA against parent corporation defendants. One would also
certainly not expect the opinion to conclude that the record before
the Court strongly suggested parent corporation liability. To the con-
trary, the decision one would expect in Bestfoods from a Court that
was truly hostile toward the environment and demonstrably pro-
business in its approach to environmental cases would be nothing
122 Whether to pierce the corporate veil and hold shareholders liable for what otherwise
would be corporate obligations is a matter of state law, and the courts consider a number
of factors in reaching this determination, including "fraud, illegality, contravention of
contract, public wrong, inequity, and whether the corporation was formed to defeat pub-
lic convenience." FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 121, § 41 (citation omitted).
123 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63.
124 Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
125 See id. at 72-73 (identifying findings that an employee of the parent corporation was ac-
tively involved in environmental matters at the subsidiary's chemical plant as sufficient to
raise a question on remand as to whether the parent could be held liable for the EPA's
response costs as an operator under section 107 of CERCLA).
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short of a pronouncement that CERCLA did not under any circum-
stances provide a cause of action to seek costs from parent corpora-
tions for the hazardous substance sins of their subsidiary corpora-
tions.
C. Seminole Tribe Revisited
The rebirth of federalism did result in the Court overruling Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co., 126 which had held that private parties could
use CERCLA to seek response costs from states if a state agency
caused or contributed to a release of hazardous substances. 127 Since
the Seminole Tribe decision did not, however, invalidate a single provi-
sion of CERCLA, 2 8 one of the key pollution control statutes used to
compel the remediation of sites with contaminated soil and ground-
water, it is not a federalism-based decision that is suggestive at all of
an anti-environmental attitude by the Rehnquist Court. In overruling
Union Gas, the Court did not find difficulty with the cost recovery
scheme established by Congress under section 107(a) of CERCLA.
Rather, what the Court found problematic was that the plurality deci-
sion in Union Gas had "created confusion among the lower courts
that have sought to understand and apply the deeply fractured deci-
sion." 129 Thus, Union Gas, in practice, because of its inconsistent and
opaque plurality decision, proved difficult for the lower courts to
make sense of and apply, as well as for litigants to follow.
Admittedly, Seminole Tribe foreclosed, based upon Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, the ability of private parties to
bring suit against states under the cost-recovery provisions of
CERCLA. But it must be pointed out that, to the extent a state is
deemed a potentially responsible party under CERCLA's liability pro-
visions, the statute still exists as a robust enforcement tool; the EPA,
which is the lead agency at the vast majority of so-called "Superfund"
sites, may still include the state as a defendant in a cost-recovery ac-
tion or otherwise compel the state to take appropriate action to ad-
dress the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. 130
126 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
127 Id. at 22-23.
128 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (holding that the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act did not validly abrogate sovereign immunity). For a summary of
the Seminole Tribe decision, see supra Part I.B.3.
129 Id. at 64.
130 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000), (defining "persons" who may incur liability as in-
cluding, among others, a "State, municipality... political subdivision of a State, or any in-
terstate body"); United States v. Stringfellow, No. 2:83-CV-02501, 1995 WL 450856, at *5
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III. PREEMPTION: FURTHER DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY ROLES OF THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
A. Summary of the Federal Preemption Doctrine
Doctrinally, preemption is closely tied to federalism, and preemp-
tion was raised by litigants as a basis to challenge state and local regu-
latory efforts in several of the pollution control cases heard by the
Rehnquist Court.1 3  As a constitutional doctrine, preemption is
rooted in the Supremacy Clause, which provides in part that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Under the Supremacy Clause, since McCulloch v. Maryland,133 "it
has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'with-
out effect.'"3'
It follows, therefore, that preemption challenges in pollution con-
trol cases arose before the Rehnquist Court when the federal gov-
ernment had enacted a comprehensive regulatory program in an
area later subjected to further state or local regulation. The presence
of such dual regulation alone is insufficient to always find preemp-
tion of state or local pollution control efforts. In fact, the Court has
been hesitant to find preemption of state and local pollution control
regulations, because there is a presumption against preemption of
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 1995) (finding California responsible under CERCLA for a 65% share
of the costs associated with the investigation and remediation of the Stringfellow Super-
fund site).
131 To the extent that preemption serves to allocate legislative power between the federal
and state governments, perhaps it is rightfully another aspect of the Rehnquist Court's
revitalization of federalism. See, e.g., Ernst A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisnu,
83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2004) (broadening the analysis of Rehnquist Court federalism to
include preemption cases).
132 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)
("[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 'any
state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is
contrary to federal law, must yield.'" (quoting Felder v. Casey, 437 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
133 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
134 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
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laws and regulations enacted pursuant to the police powers of the
states. 115
To determine whether a particular state or local law survives a
preemption challenge, the Court first and foremost looks to the in-
tent of Congress, 36 and if it is the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress"'3 7 in enacting a federal statute that it preempts state or lo-
cal law, then the state or local statute should have no effect as a result
of the express intent of Congress. Express preemption is not the only
way that a state or local regulatory effort may be found ineffective,
since preemption may implicitly occur when a federal statute "so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it."" 3"
A state or local statute may also be subject to preemption if necessary
to avoid a conflict with federal law. 
39
B. Preemption Challenges and the Pollution Control Statutes
Rather than using preemption to diminish the states and local
governments' ability to enhance environmental protection-as one
would anticipate from an anti-environmental, pro-business Court-
what the pollution control cases decided by the Rehnquist Court il-
lustrate is a rejection, with one notable exception, of preemption as a
means of challenging either citizen action or state and local govern-
mental efforts to regulate pollution. The pollution control cases in-
volving preemption challenges show a Court that routinely rejected
such challenges in an effort to maintain the delicate balance between
the competing roles of the federal, state, and local efforts that under-
lie the cooperative federalism addressing pollution control. In doing
so, the Court by and large left states, local governments, and their
citizens with the ability to craft tailored responses to uniquely local
135 See id. at 518 ("[W]e must construe ... provisions in light of the presumption against the
pre-emption of state police power regulations.").
136 See id. at 516 ("The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analy-
sis." (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
137 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
138 Id. (quoting Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
139 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) ("Absent explicit
pre-emptive language, we have recognized... conflict pre-emption, where 'compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility'...." (quoting Fla. Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)); Weiland, supra note 113,
at 252 ("The Supreme Court has developed a tripartite typology of preemption: express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.").
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
environmental concerns, notwithstanding the existence of pervasive
federal pollution control legislation.
1. International Paper v. Ouellette
In one of the first pollution control cases encountered by the
Court with Rehnquist as its Chief Justice, the International Paper
Company defended a nuisance action brought by Vermont residents
against a facility located on the New York side of Lake Champlain by
arguing that the claim based on Vermont common law was pre-
empted by the comprehensive nature of the CWA.140 Recognizing
that Congress plainly intended to occupy the field of water pollution
control,1 41 the Court did find that the CWA "precludes a court from
applying the law of an affected State against an out-of-state source," 
1 42
which, in turn, prohibited application of Vermont common law as a
means of controlling offensive discharges from the International Pa-
per Company's New York facility. In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Powell was mindful of the importance of maintaining a balance be-
tween not only the federal government and the states, but between
the respective states too:
If a New York source were liable for violations of Vermont law, that law
could effectively override both the permit requirements and the policy
choices made by the source State .... If the Vermont court ruled that re-
spondents were entitled to the full amount of damages and injunctive re-
lief sought in the complaint, at a minimum [International Paper Com-
pany] would have to change its methods of doing business and
controlling pollution to avoid the threat of ongoing liability. In suits
such as this, an affected-state court also could require the source to cease
operations by ordering immediate abatement. Critically, these liabilities
would attach even though the source has complied fully with its state and
federal permit obligations. The inevitable result of such suits would be
that Vermont and other States could do indirectly what they could not do
directly-regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources.143
140 See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 484 (1987). The specific question before
the Court was "whether the [CWA] pre-empts a common-law nuisance suit filed in a Ver-
mont court under Vermont law, when the source of the alleged injury is located in New
York." Id. at 483.
141 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981) (finding that when Con-
gress amended the CWA in 1972, it intended to "establish an all-encompassing program
of water pollution regulation" that preempted federal common law).
142 Int'l Paper, 479 U.S. at 494.
143 Id. at 495; see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[I]t
seems implausible that Congress meant to preserve or confer any right of the state claim-
ing injury (State II) or its citizens to seek enforcement of limitations on discharges in
State I by applying the statutes or common law of State II. Such a complex scheme of in-
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While foreclosing application of the Vermont common law, the Court
in International Paper, however, did not conclude that the CWA pre-
empted all state-based common law remedies targeting water pollu-
tion. The Vermont residents' suit could proceed, so long as the court
below applied the common law of the discharger's state, or specifi-
cally in International Paper, New York common law, instead of Ver-
mont common law.'" Through this result the Court preserved the
permitting scheme established by Congress under the CWA and
avoided subjecting dischargers to another state's common law. At the
same time, in a balance of competing federal and multi-state inter-
ests, the Court fashioned a state-based legal remedy for those who
were adversely impacted by discharges occurring in another state.
2. PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology
In considering a challenge to the State of Washington's authority
to impose certain requirements protective of its water quality, the
Court in PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecol-
ogy' broadly construed the power of states to impose conditions un-
der the section 401 water quality certification process of the Clean
Water Act.1 46 The specific condition at issue required a proposed hy-
droelectric power project to maintain a minimum stream flow that
the state mandated to protect aquatic life. 14  One of the arguments
rejected by the Court in this challenge to the State's section 401 au-
thority was that the limitation might conflict with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) licensing conditions for the hydroe-
lectric project and thus was preempted. 148 In concluding that neither
FERC's licensing authority nor the Federal Power Act limited the
State's section 401 authority, 149 the Court broadly construed the
terstate regulation would undermine the uniformity and state cooperation envisioned by
the [CWA].").
144 Int'l Paper, 479 U.S. at 481.
145 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
146 Id. at 710-13. Section 401 requires a water quality certification from a state before a fed-
eral license or permit is issued for any activity that may result in a discharge into naviga-
ble waters and also authorizes a state to impose limitations and monitoring requirements
on such discharges to ensure that state water quality standards and effluent limitations
are met and maintained. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1), (d) (2000).
147 PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County, 511 U.S. at 709.
148 Id. at 721-23.
149 When the minimum stream flow condition was initially challenged at the administrative
level, the Washington Pollution Control Hearings Board initially found that the condition
was preempted by the Federal Power Act. This finding was reversed on appeal to the
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power of the states to impose a wide range of conditions as part of the
CWA's water quality certification process:
No such conflict with any FERC licensing activity is presented here.
FERC has not yet acted on petitioners' license application, and it is pos-
sible that FERC will eventually deny petitioners' application altogether.
Alternatively, it is quite possible, given that FERC is required to give
equal consideration to the protection of fish habitat when deciding
whether to issue a license, that any FERC license would contain the same
conditions as the state § 401 certification.
... [T] he requirement for a state certification applies not only to ap-
plications for licenses from FERC, but to all federal licenses and permits
for activities which may result in a discharge into the Nation's navigable
150
waters.
The Court certainly understood that the states required great leeway
and flexibility in order to protect and enhance water quality, which
was a responsibility primarily left to the states under the federal
CWA1 51:
The criteria components of state water quality standards attempt to iden-
tify, for all the water bodies in a given class, water quality requirements
generally sufficient to protect designated uses. These criteria, however,
cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all the water quality issues
arising from every activity that can affect the State's hundreds of individ-
ual water bodies. Requiring the States to enforce only the criteria com-
ponent of their water quality standards would in essence require the
States to study to a level of great specificity each individual surface water
to ensure that the criteria applicable to that water are sufficiently detailed
and individualized to fully protect the water's designated uses. Given
that there is no textual support for imposing this requirement, we are
loath to attribute to Congress an intent to impose this heavy regulatory
burden on the States. 
1 2
Another noteworthy aspect of the Court's opinion in PUD No. 1 ofJef-
ferson County is the express affirmation by the Court of the impor-
tance of water quality standards under the statute:
state courts and affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court. State v. PUD No. 1 of Jef-
ferson County, 849 P.2d 646, 655-57 (Wash. 1993). The Washington Supreme Court
found that "there is neither an express nor an implied indication of any congressional in-
tent to occupy the field so as to preclude states from exercising their authority and fulfill-
ing their obligations under the Clean Water Act," and that, with respect to conflict pre-
emption, "there is no actual conflict between Ecology's action and the [Federal Power
Act]." Id. at 655.
150 PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County, 511 U.S. at 722.
151 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (providing in part that "[lit is the policy of the Congress to rec-
ognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution").
152 PUD No. I ofJefferson County, 511 U.S. at 717-18.
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Petitioners also assert more generally that the Clean Water Act is only
concerned with water "quality" and does not allow the regulation of water
"quantity." This is an artificial distinction. In many cases, water quantity
is closely related to water quality; a sufficient lowering of the water quan-
tity in a body of water could destroy all of its designated uses, be it for
drinking water, recreation, navigation or, as here, as a fishery. In any
event, there is recognition in the Clean Water Act itself that reduced
stream flow, i.e., diminishment of water quantity, can constitute waterS 155
pollution.
The broad powers of the states recognized under the CWA, coupled
with a clear rejection of the preemption challenge and the recogni-
tion of the central importance of water quality standards under the
CWA, are not conclusions that one would expect to read in an opin-
ion from a Court that was purportedly overtly hostile toward envi-
ronmental matters. Despite the preemption challenge to state au-
thority to impose conditions protective of water quality, the
Rehnquist Court affirmed the authority of the states to impose a
range of conditions through the section 401 water quality certifica-
tion process, as dictated by the water body use designation estab-
lished by each state.
3. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier
One can see a further balancing of competing regulatory interests
through the rejection of other preemption challenges in later pollu-
tion control cases when the Rehnquist Court considered attacks
against state and local regulation of pesticides under FIFRA.154 In the
153 Id. at 719. This observation in the majority opinion by Justice O'Connor was in response
to an alternative argument raised by petitioners attacking the limitation on stream flow.
This alternative argument was that the CWA only allowed the regulation of water quality
and not water quantity. Id. In addition to this argument and the one based on preemp-
tion by the FERC licensing process, the petitioners also argued that the effort by the State
of Washington to regulate under section 401 was invalid because (1) the water quality use
designation was too vague, and the CWA only authorized the enforcement of specific and
objective water quality criteria; and (2) enforcement of water quality use designations
rendered the criteria component of water quality standards superfluous. Id. at 715-17.
The Court also rejected these arguments in upholding the ability of the states to impose
conditions protective of water quality standards as part of the section 401 water quality
certification process. Id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented and would
have found in part that the Federal Power Act preempted the ability of states to also im-
pose minimum stream limits on FERC licensed hydroelectric projects. See id. at 734
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Today, the Court gives the States precisely the veto power over
hydroelectric projects that we determined in [prior cases] they did not possess.").
154 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000). As its
title suggests, FIFRA establishes a comprehensive regulatory program administered by the
EPA governing the registration, labeling, and use of pesticides, which are defined as any
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first of two such cases that appeared before the Rehnquist Court, Wis-
consin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,55 a local ordinance imposed a per-
mit requirement as a precondition to the application of pesticides on
certain properties. 156 In a unanimous decision reversing the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court's conclusion that FIFRA preempted the local pes-
ticide-permitting ordinance, the Court noted that "we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress."157 Finding no support in the text of FIFRA
for the position that Congress had expressly preempted local regula-
tion of pesticides, coupled with insufficient evidence of implied or
field preemption, the Court upheld the local permitting ordinance
regulating pesticide use.
The Court found that, unlike the CWA's far-reaching statutory
scheme that was at issue in City of Milwaukee and International Paper,
FIFRA was not "a sufficiently comprehensive statute to justify an in-
ference that Congress had occupied the field to the exclusion of the
States." 158  Thus, the states and local units of government were left
free to impose additional regulatory requirements beyond those es-
tablished by FIFRA.' 59
The preemption cases serve to further belie the argument that the
Rehnquist Court represented an era when the Supreme Court was
especially unsympathetic towards environmental litigants. Instead of
an anti-environmental Court, we see in the preemption cases a Court
wrestling with complex issues of competing federal, state, and local
regulatory interests in the pollution control arena. In response to
this struggle, the Court fashioned opinions in the preemption area
that preserved the rights of citizens to assert state common-law-based
claims in response to offensive discharges. The Rehnquist Court's
substance or mixture of substances intended "for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest," id. § 136(u) (1), or "for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desic-
cant," id. § 136(u) (2), or "any nitrogen stabilizer," id. § 136(u) (3).
155 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
156 Id. at 602-03.
157 Id. at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
158 Id. at 607.
159 In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), the Rehnquist Court heard a subse-
quent FIFRA preemption challenge. Bates involved a suit by farmers against an herbicide
manufacturer, alleging that the herbicide's harm to crops supported state law product li-
ability, breach of warranty, and deceptive trade practices claims. See generally id. at 435-
36. This preemption claim was also rejected by the Court, for reasons similar to those ar-
ticulated in Mortier, preserving state law claims despite a broad federal regulatory pro-
gram enacted under FIFRA. See id. at 442-52.
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preemption cases arising under the pollution control statutes also
maintained the ability of states and municipalities to impose regula-
tions to address unique local environmental concerns, be it flow
quantities in a river sufficient to protect aquatic life, or additional
regulations deemed necessary by local authorities to ensure proper
application of pesticides.
The preemption cases also serve to undermine the view that the
Rehnquist Court was pro-business in deciding pollution control cases.
A genuinely pro-business Rehnquist Supreme Court would not have
allowed the residents of Vermont to proceed even using New York
nuisance law, the law of the so-called source state. Instead, a pro-
business Court would have used International Paper as an opportunity
to limit all state-based common law claims against industrial dis-
chargers by conveniently holding that the CWA, due to its compre-
hensive nature, preempted not only federal common law claims, but
also all state common law remedies as well. ' 6°  Further, if the
Rehnquist Court were indeed a pro-business Court, it would have
construed FIFRA to preempt local and state efforts to impose addi-
tional pesticide regulations, and limit the ability to hold pesticide
manufacturers responsible under liability theories grounded in state
law. Such a move would have reduced the regulatory burdens and
potential liabilities faced by businesses. The Court, however, rejected
preemption challenges in the two FIFRA cases heard during the
Rehnquist era, and the holdings of the Court in these cases further
erodes the notion of the Rehnquist Supreme Court as one that was
blatantly pro-business in deciding environmental cases and, in par-
ticular, pollution control cases.
4. Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District
In response to the argument that the Rehnquist Court rejected
preemption challenges targeting state and local pollution control ef-
forts, one might argue that the Court's decision in Engine Manufactur-
ers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District 61 undercuts the
position that the Rehnquist Court's use of the preemption doctrine
was hospitable towards state and local pollution control regulation.
160 Cf City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 & n.9 (1981) (finding that, by enacting
the CWA, Congress intended to occupy the field of water pollution, thereby preempting
federal common law claims arising out of allegations of water pollution).
161 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
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After all, as pointed out in the lone dissent by Justice Souter, the ma-
jority in Engine Manufacturers Ass'n used the preemption doctrine to
forbid "one of the most polluted regions in the United States from
requiring private fleet operators to buy clean engines that are readily
available on the commercial market."1
62
The local pollution control regulations that were at issue in Engine
Manufacturers Ass'n were the so-called "Fleet Rules" enacted by the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to decrease
the emissions of ozone forming compounds in Southern California. 1
63
The Fleet Rules required the operators of certain commercial motor
vehicle fleets to purchase or lease only alternative fuel vehicles or ve-
hicles that met stringent emissions limitations.l" A coalition of auto-
mobile and engine manufacturers asserted that the Fleet Rules were
preempted by section 209 (a) of the CAA, which provides:
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall
require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the
control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle
engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or
registration of such motor vehicle, vehicle engine, or equipment.
According to the logic of the district court, the vehicle purchase re-
strictions imposed by SCAQMD were not preempted by section
209(a) for two reasons. First, they were not preempted because
"[t] he Rules regulate the purchasing and leasing, not the sale, of ve-
hicles by fleet operators."'16   Second, preemption was inapplicable
since "the Fleet Rules do not set a 'standard relating to the control of
emissions."1 67 In a short, two paragraph order, the Ninth Circuit af-
162 Id. at 259 (Souter,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
163 The six Fleet Rules were adopted as one of the measures to improve air quality in the only
region of the country designated as an extreme nonattainment area by the EPA under
the CAA. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1109 (C.D. Cal. 2001). In addition to targeting emissions of ozone precursors from mo-
tor vehicle exhaust, the rules also sought to address emissions of particulate matter asso-
ciated with diesel engines. Id. at 1109. The rules covered practically every type of vehicle
that a fleet could operate, including street sweepers, passenger cars, public transit vehi-
cles and urban buses, light duty trucks, medium duty vehicles, garbage trucks, airport pas-
senger transportation vehicles (shuttles and taxi cabs), and heavy duty on-road vehicles.
Engine Mfts. Ass'n, 541 U.S. at 249.
164 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1114-16.
165 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
166 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
167 Id.
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firmed the district court "for the reasons stated in its well-reasoned
opinion. ' '
In an eight-to-one vote reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court held that "treating sales restrictions and purchase restrictions
differently for pre-emption purposes would make no sense. The
manufacturer's right to sell federally approved vehicles is meaning-
less in the absence of a purchaser's right to buy them."' 69 Impor-
tantly, the Court did not find that the application of the Fleet Rules
was preempted under all circumstances. In another effort to main-
tain a semblance of balance between the federal government and
state governments in the environmental regulatory arena, Justice
Scalia wrote for the majority that "[iit does not necessarily follow,
however, that the Fleet Rules are pre-empted in toto."'7 ° The case was
accordingly remanded for a determination as to whether, among
other issues, the Fleet Rules were valid if construed as imposing re-
strictions only on state purchase decisions and not those of private
fleet operators. 171
An argument that the Engine Manufacturers Ass'n decision was anti-
environmental and pro-business-because the Court used preemp-
tion to negate the ability of SCAQMD to regulate the types of vehicles
that fleet operators could purchase-is misdirected as aimed at the
Rehnquist Court.1 72 The Court's holding is simply too well-grounded
in the plain language of section 209 (a) of the CAA for such criticisms
to have merit. 73  Given that provision, which expressly preempted
states from regulating emissions from automobiles and engines, the
Court had little choice but to respect the unambiguous language of
the statute and conclude that the SCAQMD Fleet Rules were pre-
empted. To hold otherwise would have required the Court to com-
pletely ignore the clear statutory language in section 209 (a) prohibit-
168 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 309 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2002).
169 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255 (2004).
170 Id. at 258.
171 Id. at 258-59.
172 See, e.g., Rebecca Noblin, Comment, Engine Manufacturers Association, et al. v. South
Coast Air Quality Management District, et al., 28 HARV. L. REV. 571, 575 (2004) (asserting
that the Court's analysis of the preemptive effect of section 209(a) was "textually weak
and runs contrary to both legislative intent" and prior EPA interpretation).
173 Even Professor Lazarus, who is generally critical of the Supreme Court's rulings in envi-
ronmental cases, found that the statute supported the Court's decision in Engine Manufac-
turers Association. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law and the US. Su-
preme Court, [2005] 35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,503, 10,511 (concluding, after
an analysis of the Engine Manufacturers Association decision, among other environmental
cases heard during the Court's October 2003 Term, that "[t]he plain meaning of the
statute provides ample support for the result").
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ing any efforts by the states to impose emission standards or to re-
quire any other approval relating to vehicle or engine emissions as a
condition of sale.
Furthermore, the Court's decision in Engine Manufacturers Ass'n is
abundantly supported by strong public policy concerns regarding
what level of government is best situated to regulate emissions associ-
ated with mobile sources such as automobiles, trucks, and buses. In
considering these public policy concerns, there are overwhelming
reasons for concluding that the effort to regulate tailpipe emissions
from mobile sources is, with limited exception, appropriately a solely
federal function.174 That is, section 209 (a) was enacted as a means of
protecting not only manufacturers, but also consumers from legiti-
mate concerns about the difficulties that compliance with multi-
jurisdictional vehicle emissions standards would present, unless ex-
pressly prohibited by Congress:
The reasons given for the enactment of the pre-emption provision can be
summarized as follows: to protect the manufacturer against having to
build engines which would comply with a multiplicity of standards (Sena-
tor Muskie); to protect the vehicle owner from having to deal with differ-
ent standards in each state in which he drives (Undersecretary Coston);
to avoid the unnecessary duplication of federal standards; to avoid 'un-
necessary expense' to the owner (the Senate Public Works Committee);
and generally to avoid 'chaos' and 'confusion.' (Thomas Mann, Under-
171secretary Coston, and the Senate Public Works Committee).
Had the Engine Manufacturers Ass'n decision affirmed the ability of
SCAQMD to impose the challenged vehicle purchase restrictions,
undoubtedly a number of states would have followed California's lead
and adopted a similar regulatory approach, and manufacturers and
consumers conceivably would have faced countless, but potentially
dissimilar, emissions-related standards to consider in the manufac-
ture, sale, and purchase of vehicles. This scenario would have pre-
sented owners of multijurisdictional fleets and automotive and en-
gine manufacturers with a difficult regulatory quandary, as they
attempted to purchase and manufacture compliant vehicles and en-
gines. Highly mobile consumers, too, likely would have confronted
174 Because California adopted automobile emissions limits well before Congress did so, the
CAA does provide a waiver to section 209(a) preemption for (1) California mobile emis-
sions standards that were in effect at the time of the adoption of the federal standards,
and (2) those states that adopt existing California mobile source emission limits. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7543(b) (2000).
175 California ex rel. State Air Res. Bd. v. Dep't of Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271, 1285 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (quoting David P. Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-
emption, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1083, 1090-91 (1970)), affd, 624 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980).
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compliance issues as they traveled or relocated from one state to an-
other. Regulators would have faced difficult enforcement issues as
they sought to determine whether, for example, an automobile pur-
chased in Illinois met the emissions requirements of its owner's new
state of residence. The decision in Engine Manufacturers Ass'n right-
fully avoided these practical difficulties. The decision also respected
the express will of Congress that the efforts to regulate mobile source
emissions properly lie with the federal government, and not with state
or local units of government, for sound public policy reasons.
IV. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE POLLUTION CONTROL CASES
There are several pollution control cases decided by the
Rehnquist Court that implicated neither of the constitutional-based
doctrines of federalism or preemption. This line of cases required
the Court to apply principles of statutory construction to particular
provisions of the pollution control statutes. Of course, the Supreme
Court has interpreted statutes throughout its history. One of the no-
table aspects of the Rehnquist Court that is relevant to this Article,
however, is that the pollution control cases that raise issues of pure
statutory interpretation-even more so than those where constitu-
tional issues such as federalism or preemption arose-unmistakably
demonstrate that the Rehnquist Court was not anti-environmental or
pro-business. In part, this is because one of the most significant chal-
lenges to a pollution control statute occurred during the Rehnquist
era; specifically, the threat to certain provisions of the CAA presented
in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 7 6 brought by powerful busi-
ness interests, was such that, if the challenge had been successful on
the merits, it would have been perhaps the most significant victory for
business interests before the Court in the history of environmental
law. 177 The Court rejected this challenge and protected the CAA
from this serious assault by business. To side against the arguments
raised by such powerful interests is not the expected outcome from a
Court that supposedly sided with commerce over regulatory efforts to
protect the environment.
In addition to the American Trucking Ass'ns case brought on behalf
of influential business interests, two of the cases raising issues of pure
176 531 U.S. 457 (2001). SeeinfraPartlV.B.1.
177 For a detailed discussion of the litigation strategy and significance of Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, see Christopher H. Schroeder, The Story ofAmerican Trucking: The Block-
buster Case that Misfired, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, 322-23 (Richard J. Lazarus and
Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
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statutory construction were brought by well-recognized public inter-
est environmental groups. If the Rehnquist Court were so clearly
predisposed to exhibit hostility against environmentalists, the Court
should have ruled against the environmental plaintiffs. But that was
not the outcome in either City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund7 " or Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc.179 By ruling in favor of the environmental groups in both
these cases the Rehnquist Court once again defied the stereotype that
it was overtly anti-environmental.
A. The Rehnquist Court's Methodology of Statutory Interpretation
The Rehnquist Court's approach to interpretation of the pollu-
tion control statutes reflects one of the other guiding principles that,
in addition to the federalism revolution, emerged during Rehnquist's
reign as Chief Justice. This guiding principle is the controversial po-
sition that legislative history should be completely ignored as one of
the tools that the Court should consider in its efforts to decipher
what Congress intended by its use of a particular word, phrase, or
provision in a statute.80 Justice Scalia, without a doubt, has been the
primary proponent of this negative view of legislative history in the
context of statutory construction.1 8 ' His position that the Court
should not look to legislative history as an aid in statutory analysis
arises from a belief that it is only legitimate for the Court to examine
the text of the statute in question, with perhaps at most a reference to
a dictionary to divine the plain meaning of the words used by Con-182
gress. The refusal by Justice Scalia to rely upon any aspect of a stat-
178 511 U.S. 328 (1994). See inftaPartIV.B.2.
179 528 U.S. 167 (2000). See infra Part IV.B.3.
180 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (concluding
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also encompassed same-sex sexual harass-
ment, noting that "it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed"); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing the view
that as a statutory interpretation tool, congressional committee reports are unreliable
.not only as a genuine indicator of congressional intent but as a safe predictor ofjudicial
construction").
181 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of I.egislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281
(1990) (noting that the use of legislative history was under assault from within the Su-
preme Court and that the "movement's spiritual leader isJustice Scalia").
182 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Pluralistic Theoy, and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 660 (1994) (remarking about Justice Scalia's approach to
statutory interpretation that "[m]ost importantly, all forms of legislative history are out of
bounds, in part because of the danger of manipulation .... In contrast, other interpre-
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ute's legislative history is premised, in part, upon a skepticism that
congressional committee reports and other traditional sources of leg-
islative history have any value in determining the meaning of statutes
and that such extra-statutory sources may indeed mislead the
Court. 3
Not all members of the Court during Rehnquist's tenure as Chief
Justice agreed with the view that legislative history has no place in
statutory interpretation. 18 4 While still the ChiefJudge of the First Cir-
cuit, Justice Breyer wrote:
[O]ne should recall that legislative history is a judicial tool, one judges
use to resolve difficult problems ofjudicial interpretation. It can bejusti-
fied, at least in part, by its ability to help judges interpret statutes, in a
manner that makes sense and that will produce a workable set of laws. If
judicial use of legislative history achieves this kind of result, courts might
use it as part of their overarching interpretive task of producing a coher-
ent and relatively consistent body of statutory law, even were the 'rational
member of Congress' a pure fiction, made up out of whole cloth.8 5
The approach of the Court and its position on the use of legisla-
tive history as a statutory interpretive tool did evolve as the composi-
tion of the Court changed while Rehnquist was Chief Justice. Con-
sider, for example, one of the first pollution control cases decided
during the Rehnquist era, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
tive aids, such as contemporary dictionaries and usage reflected in other contemporary
statutes, may be freely consulted"); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice
Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1136 (1992) ("Moreover, in
Justice Scalia's view, placing legislative intent before the text constitutes a 'backwards'
method of statutory interpretation because one can determine legislative purpose only by
'examining the language that Congress used.'" (footnote omitted)).
183 See, e.g., Mortier, 501 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting in the con-
text of FIFRA's legislative history, that "we should try to give the text its fair meaning,
whatever various committees might have had to say-thereby affirming the proposition
that we are a Government of laws, not of committee reports").
184 In response to Justice Scalia's position questioning the value of legislative history in the
Court's work, Justice White writing for the Mortier majority commented: "As for the pro-
priety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from
reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it.... Legislative history materials
are not generally so misleading that jurists should never employ them in a good-faith ef-
fort to discern legislative intent." Id. at 611-12 n.4.
185 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 867 (1992). By no means did Chief Justice Rehnquist necessarily agree with Justice
Scalia's position concerning the supposed impropriety of turning to legislative history as a
means of assisting the Court in its interpretation of statutes. See Merill, supra note 182, at
653 (noting that "there is little evidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist shares or is even
sympathetic to Justice Scalia's strong allergy to legislative history," yet "to avoid fragment-
ing the Court... apparently agreed to drop the erstwhile obligatory discussion of legisla-
tive history").
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Foundation, Inc.,'5 6 where, in writing the majority opinion, Justice Mar-
shall relied heavily on legislative history to support the conclusion
that section 505 of the CWA'87 did not confer upon citizen plaintiffs
the right to seek redress for wholly past violations.' 8  In contrast,
moving forward near the end of the Rehnquist era, we see the influ-
ence of Justice Scalia's position concerning the inappropriateness of
looking to legislative history as a guide in interpreting statutes. In
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns,i8 9 decided almost fifteen years af-
ter Gwaltney of Smithfield, there is absolutely no mention of legislative
history in the majority opinion as a means of either determining con-
gressional intent or in supporting the Court's holding.' 90 A starkly
different approach to Justice Scalia's negative view of the validity of
legislative history as a tool of statutory interpretation is Justice
Breyer's concurrence in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, which is
grounded almost in its entirety upon the legislative history of the
Clean Air Act. '9'
Although not accepted by every Justice, over time Justice Scalia's
view that legislative history was not a reliable tool for use in the con-
struction of statutes gained wide support in the Court during the
Rehnquist era, and is reflected in the Court's approach to interpret-
ing pollution control statutes during this period. The disdain for leg-
islative history influenced the Rehnquist Court's later decisions in
several pollution control cases where the majority made no mention
or use of the legislative history materials readily available and relevant
to the statute in question.192 Nonetheless, this controversial approach
to statutory construction did not result in any interpretive missteps in
the pollution control cases and lends no support to the view that the
Rehnquist Court interpreted pollution statutes in a manner inconsis-
tent with their ultimate goal of environmental protection.
186 484 U.S. 49 (1987). See infra Part IV.C.
187 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (authorizing citizen suits against any person in violation of the CWA
or against the EPA for the failure of the administrator to undertake any nondiscretionary
duty required by the statute).
188 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 61-63.
189 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
190 Id. at 462-86.
191 Id. at 490-96 (BreyerJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
192 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv's, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004); S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516
U.S. 479 (1996); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994). In none of
these cases did the Court look to legislative history materials for guidance in reaching a
decision.
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B. Rejection of Statutory Interpretation-Based Challenges to the Applicability
of Pollution Control Statutes
1. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns
The Rehnquist Court was presented in Whitman v. American Truck-
ing Assns' 93 with a challenge concerning the process used by the EPA
to establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under
the CAA. 194 The challenge arose when the EPA promulgated revised
NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter' 95 because new scientific
data showed that the existing standards were not protective of human
health, lacking an adequate margin of safety, as mandated by Con-
gress in section 109 of the CAA.
This challenge in American Trucking Ass'ns was undoubtedly an
uphill struggle for the coalition of powerful business interests that
filed suit seeking to invalidate the newly promulgated NAAQS for
ozone and particulate matter, since one of the central issues pre-
sented-whether the EPA was required to consider costs when it es-
tablished or modified NAAQS'96-had long ago been raised before;
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered and re-
jected this suggestion in Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. EPA.'97 The
193 531 U.S. 457 (2001). The specific issues before the Court in American Trucking Ass'ns in-
cluded: (1) whether by enacting section 109(b)(1) of the CAA, which requires the EPA
to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), Congress improperly delegated a
legislative power to the agency; (2) whether the EPA was required to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis when setting NAAQS under section 109; (3) whether the court of appeals
had jurisdiction to review the EPA's position regarding the need to revise the NAAQS for
ozone; and (4) whether the EPA's interpretation concerning its statutory authority to es-
tablish revised NAAQS was permissible. Id. at 462.
194 The NAAQS are one of the central components of the CAA regulatory regime for sta-
tionary sources and establish a minimal baseline for air quality throughout the country.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000). This Section requires the EPA to enact primary NAAQS that
are protective of human health and the environment, and secondary NAAQS that are
protective of the public welfare. Through the NAAQS, the EPA determines permissible
national levels for certain pollutants, and then the states establish how the NAAQS will be
met through regulation of stationary sources. Id. §§ 7408-7410. Under section 109(d),
the EPA must review and, if deemed necessary, revise the NAAQS every five years. Id.
§ 7409(d).
195 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 40 C.F.R. § 50.6-50.7
(1997); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 40 C.F.R. § 50.9-50.10
(1997).
196 Reflecting the cumbersome NAAQS process, the EPA has set NAAQS for only a handful
of pollutants, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, lead, ozone, and particu-
late matter. 40 C.F.R. § 50.4-50.12 (2006).
197 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1049 (1980). In American Trucking
Ass'ns, the challengers argued that the Lead Industries Ass'n case was wrongfully decided
for two reasons. First, it was asserted that the express language of section 109, which re-
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renewed attack on the NAAQS process in American Trucking Ass'ns was
of particular importance, nonetheless, because it questioned for the
first time before the Supreme Court one of the central underpin-
nings of the CAA: the ability of the EPA to establish ambient air qual-
ity standards uniformly applicable throughout the country without
requiring consideration by the agency of the costs that such standards
would impose on regulated entities. Put another way, the challengers
in American Trucking Ass'ns sought to impose a cost-benefit analysis
obligation upon the NAAQS-setting aspect of the EPA's regulatory
authority under the CAA.159
Success before the Court by industry in its efforts to require the
EPA to justify the NAAQS on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis would
have had profound implications for the fundamental regulatory
scheme that underlies the CAA. If the interpretation of section 109
of the CAA offered by business interests were accepted by the Court
in American Trucking Ass'ns, it would have subjected the NAAQS proc-
ess to endless rounds of litigation featuring battling economists and
other financial experts opining on the costs of complying with the
standards compared to the benefits, or lack thereof, that the stan-
dards provided. Based upon such a cost-benefit analysis requirement,
given the unpredictable nature of litigation, it is conceivable that a
quired the EPA to set the NAAQS at levels that were protective of the "public health," im-
plicitly required the EPA to consider costs because "'[p]ublic health' was, of course, a
well-established profession in 1970" when Congress enacted the NAAQS provisions, and
"[t]he discipline [of public health] then, as now, is practiced through a synthesis of
medical and social sciences, with a significant emphasis on economics." Brief for Cross-
Petitioners at 33, Am. TruckingAss'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-1426), 2000 WL 1014021. Ac-
cordingly, since the public health profession included economics in its considerations of
what was beneficial to the overall health of the public, the EPA was therefore required to
consider costs as part of its rulemaking deliberations in setting the NAAQS. Id. Second,
it was argued that because other provisions of the CAA required consideration of costs,
the lower court in Lead Industries Ass'n should have interpreted section 109 to also require
the EPA to consider costs associated with the NAAQS. Id. at 38-41.
198 See id. at 28-30 (asserting that there were three alternatives under which the EPA could
set NAAQS, and that the third alternative required a cost-benefit analysis which was "pre-
cluded by Lead Industries"). The challengers added that
[o]nly the third of these options-a systematic weighing of pros and cons based
upon rejection of Lead Industries-can be squared with this Court's precedents....
As this Court has noted, it is generally "unreasonable to assume that Congress in-
tended to give [an agency] the unprecedented power over American Industry" to
"impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, benefit."
Id. at 30-31 (alteration in original); see also Schroeder, supra note 177, at 331-40 (point-
ing out the importance to industry of imposing a cost-benefit analysis requirement on the
EPA in setting NAAQS and noting that given the significant costs associated with CAA
compliance, "the benefit-cost principle is the Holy Grail of the regulatory reform for
business and industry").
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court might have invalidated certain NAAQS. The result of requiring
the consideration of costs and benefits in the NAAQS calculus also
would have served to increase the administrative burden the agency
would face in the development or modification of the NAAQS, an al-
ready cumbersome regulatory process, since newfound economic ex-
pertise would have to play a key role in NAAQS development.'
Lastly, a ruling in favor of industry in American Trucking Ass'ns would
have made other pollution control statutes vulnerable to claims, ei-
ther in court or before Congress, that the costs associated with com-
pliance far exceeded the benefits, thus potentially calling into ques-
tion significant portions of the federal environmental regulatory
200apparatus.
However, concerning the argument that the EPA was required to
account for the costs imposed on businesses and industries when issu-
ing new or revised NAAQS, Justice Scalia turned to the express com-
mand of Congress in section 109(b) that required the EPA to estab-
lish NAAQS which "are requisite to protect the public health" with
"an adequate margin of safety., 20 ' And, recognizing that costs were
not mentioned as a factor for the EPA to weigh under the statute, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that "[w] ere it not for the hundreds of pages of
briefing respondents have submitted on the issue, one would have
thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to con-
sider costs in setting the standards., 2°2 Justice Scalia rightfully found
that "[t]he text of § 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical
context and with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole, un-
ambiguously bars cost consideration from the NAAQS-setting proc-
ess," 203 and thus the Court overwhelmingly rejected the challenge by
199 Sections 108 and 109 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409, set out the statutory require-
ments for the EPA to adopt NAAQS. The detailed regulations that the EPA follows in es-
tablishing these standards are found at 40 C.F.R. § 50.
200 See Schroeder, supra note 177, at 322-23 ("[I]f the regulated community could succeed
here, the same legal theories would almost certainly ripple outwards to impact other as-
pects of national environmental law and policy as well. Thus there was a tremendous
amount at stake in American Trucking."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Consti-
tutional, 98 MICH. L. REv. 303, 310 (1999) (commenting on the D.C. Circuit's decision in
American Trucking Ass'ns and noting that "[o]n its face, the American Trucking decision
would seem to draw into serious constitutional question not only EPA's ozone and par-
ticulates regulations, but also.., a wide range of decisions by many other agencies in-
volved in the protection of health and welfare").
201 Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1)).
202 Id. at 465.
203 Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
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industry. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the D.C. Circuit's much
earlier groundbreaking decision in Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA.
2
1
4
In the end, the NAAQS process established by section 109 of the
CAA survived the industry challenge when the Rehnquist Court re-
jected, without a single dissent, both the nondelegation argument,
2 0 5
and the position that Lead Industries Ass'n was wrongly decided more
than twenty years before American Trucking Ass'ns. The Court inter-
preted the CAA so that the costs associated with compliance continue
to play no role in the NAAQS-setting efforts of EPA. Once a pollut-
ant is listed under section 108206 by the administrator, the obligation
to establish a NAAQS specific to that pollutant at a level that is "req-
204 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that "economic considerations play no
part in the promulgation of ambient air quality standards under Section 109").
205 The challengers also raised a constitutional argument in their vigorous assault upon sec-
tion 109 of the CAA. While the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking Ass'ns rejected the ar-
gument that the EPA was required to consider costs in setting the NAAQS, the lower
court surprisingly did agree with the industry challengers that the EPA's interpretation of
its section 109 authority to set NAAQS violated the rarely invoked nondelegation doc-
trine. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Whitman, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The non-
delegation doctrine derives from Article I of the Constitution, which provides in part that
"[a]ll legislative Powers herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United States," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, and "is rooted in the principle of separation of powers," Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). "The fundamental precept of the delegation
doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress ... and may not be conveyed
to another branch or entity." Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, it is recognized that Congress's ability to govern effectively re-
quires delegation of certain actions to the numerous agencies that administer the federal
government's programs. To do so, however, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that Congress must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the per-
son or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
at 472 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting J.W. Hamp-
ton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). The D.C. Circuit's acceptance
of the nondelegation challenge was particularly unexpected, since the Supreme Court
has only invalidated congressional action twice under the doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 473-74
("In the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in
only two statutes. .. ."). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's
nondelegation holding, finding that the EPA's application of section 109 was entirely
consistent with the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 474. The discretion provided to the
EPA in setting NAAQS was "in fact well within the outer limits of our nondelegation
precedents." Id. For a critique of the Court's historic approach to nondelegation cases,
see generally David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1223 (1985).
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (setting forth the requirements for when the EPA Administrator shall
list pollutants). Once listed under section 108, the obligation to establish a NAAQS for
the listed pollutant is mandatory. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 411 F.
Supp. 864, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[W]e have determined that the statutory scheme con-
templates a mandatory duty on the part of the Administrator."), aff'd, 545 F.2d 320 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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uisite to protect the public health, 2 °7 and that provides "an adequate
margin of safety 2 8 are the criteria that guide the EPA's decision; the
costs that are imposed on industry to achieve those goals are not a de-
terminative factor. As a result of the Court's decision, other pollution
control statutes were also spared from similar arguments that would
have been made in an effort to derail their regulatory impact by as-
serting that the costs simply outweighed the benefits, had industry
prevailed in American Trucking Ass'ns.
2. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund
Another pollution control decision contrary to the assertions of
the Rehnquist Court's abundant anti-environmentalism is City of Chi-
cago v. Environmental Defense Fund.20 9  There, the Court agreed with
the statutory interpretation offered by several prominent environ-
mental groups that the subtitle C hazardous waste requirements of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 210 applied to
the more-than-100,000 tons of waste ash that were generated annually
by a municipal household waste-to-energy facility operated by the City
of Chicago. The City asserted that the waste ash was not subject to
RCRA regulation as a hazardous waste because of a provision ex-
pressly exempting waste-to-energy facilities or "resource recovery" fa-
cilities from RCRA subtitle C regulation so long as such facilities only
211incinerated non-hazardous wastes.
207 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
208 Id.
209 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
210 RCRA subtitle C, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e, imposes stringent requirements on the gen-
eration, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. "Hazardous wastes" as used
in RCRA and its implementing regulations is a term of art and encompasses wastes that
have been specifically designated or listed as hazardous wastes by the EPA, see, e.g., 40
C.F.R. §§ 261.11, 261.30-35 (2006), or wastes that exhibit one or more of the four de-
fined RCRA hazardous characteristics including ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or tox-
icity, id. §§ 261.20-24.
211 Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. at 334. The particular exemption relied upon by the City of
Chicago for its position that the ash was beyond the purview of the RCRA hazardous
waste regulations provides in part that:
A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass burning of municipal
solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise
managing hazardous wastes... if-(1) such facility-(A) receives and burns
only-(i) household waste .... and (ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial
sources that does not contain hazardous waste ... and (B) does not accept haz-
ardous wastes.., and (2) the owner or operator of such facility has established
contractual requirements or other.., procedures to assure that hazardous wastes
are not received and burned at or burned in such facility.
42 U.S.C. § 6921 (i).
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The Environmental Defense Fund argued that the exemption did
not apply to the ash generated by the combustion of such wastes if
the ash otherwise qualified as an RCRA-regulated hazardous waste
due to its toxicity.2 12  In agreeing with the Environmental Defense
Fund and its construction of the RCRA exemption, Justice Scalia rec-
ognized the potential negative implications for the environment if
the Court allowed the disposal of toxic ash to escape RCRA subtitle C
regulation. He wrote the following, which one might mistake as an
excerpt from the Environmental Defense Fund's brief submitted to
the Court:
[RCRA] does not explicitly exempt [ash] generated by a resource recov-
ery facility from regulation as a hazardous waste. In light of that differ-
ence, and given the statute's express declaration of national policy that
"[w]aste that is ... generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so
as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the
environment," we cannot interpret the statute to permit [ash] sufficiently
toxic to qualify as hazardous to be disposed of in ordinary landfills.213
Thus, RCRA was construed by the Court to impose upon the City
of Chicago, and similarly situated municipalities operating waste-to-
energy or resource recovery facilities, the obligation to dispose of the
resulting ash as hazardous waste at dramatically higher costs than if it
were exempted from RCRA hazardous waste regulation. This is an-
other result that is inconsistent with the purported anti-
environmental leanings of the Rehnquist Court, and is also an exam-
ple where the Rehnquist-led Supreme Court interpreted a pollution
control statute in a manner that resulted in providing greater envi-
ronmental protection and rejected an interpretation that would have
resulted in less protection for the environment. Importantly, in
reaching this conclusion, the Court sided with one of the country's
most visible pro-environment groups, the Environmental Defense
Fund, 14 which is entirely inconsistent with the view that the
Rehnquist Court was openly hostile to environmental groups.
212 Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. at 330. Toxicity is one of the four defined characteristics of a
hazardous waste. See supra note 210. Under the EPA's regulatory approach to determin-
ing toxicity, a waste material is toxic, and hence a hazardous waste, if the level of one or
more specified constituents meets or exceeds regulatory limits as determined through an
analytical test referred to in the RCRA regulations as the "Toxicity Characteristic Leach-
ing Procedure." 40 C.F.R. § 261.24. (2006).
213 Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
214 The Environmental Defense Fund was founded in 1967 after a group of scientists pre-
vailed in obtaining a ban on the use of the pesticide DDT. Environmental Defense Fund,
Origin and History, http://www.environmentaldefense.org/aboutus.cfm?tagID=362 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2007). According to the Environmental Defense Fund, its efforts to ban
the use of DDT resulted in "the birth of modem environmental law." Id. It further
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3. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc.
In yet one more pollution control case running counter to the as-
sertion that the Rehnquist Court was anti-environment and pro-
business, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc.215 asked whether environmental groups could file suit un-
der the citizen suit provision of the CWA2 6 against an industrial dis-
charger for longstanding permit violations.1 7  The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals had determined that the suit became moot when,
following initiation of litigation, the defendant arguably achieved
compliance with its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit limits.2 18 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated
the district court's order assessing a $405,800 penalty.
21 9
Prior to the Court's decision in this case, if one accepted the posi-
tion that the Rehnquist Court was anti-environment and pro-business,
it would have followed that the decision of the appeals court below
would have been overwhelmingly affirmed, given the Rehnquist
Court's supposed bias towards business interests over those who pro-
mote environmental causes. Any such prediction, however, that the
case would result in a ruling exonerating the industrial defendant
from culpability for violating the CWA would have widely missed the
mark. In a 7 to 2 decision, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court ruled in favor of the environmental groups, and the Fourth
Circuit's decision mooting the citizen's enforcement action was re-
versed.
The industrial challenger, of course, urged the Court to affirm the
court below. It argued that the environmental groups lacked stand-
ing, which had presented a significant hurdle that citizen plaintiffs in
environmental cases were finding increasingly difficult to clear, but
boasts that it is "one of America's most influential environmental advocacy groups, now
with over 500,000 members and more Ph.D. scientists and economists on staff than any
similar organization." Id.
215 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
216 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
217 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 178.
218 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir.
1998). Under section 402 of the CWA, the discharge of a pollutant to waters of the
United States is prohibited without a national pollutant discharge elimination system
permit or NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
219 See Friends of the Earth, 149 F.3d at 307 (finding that civil penalties would not redress any
injury suffered by the plaintiffs).
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the standing argument was quickly dispensed with by the Court. ° In
perhaps the most important aspect of the Court's decision, the major-
ity expressly rejected the proposition that plaintiffs in citizen suit
proceedings had to present evidence of cognizable environmental
harm to have standing; rather, the majority found that injury to the
plaintiff would suffice to meet the standing requirements of injury in
fact, as articulated by the Court in prior cases. 2' In so doing, the
Court explicitly recognized the deterrent effect of civil penalties ob-
tained through successful citizen suit litigation, and thus realized the
important contribution such suits provide as a critical aspect of envi-
ronmental enforcement. 222 The Court's holding in Friends of the Earth
concerning standing was even more significant because it reaffirmed
the ability of environmental groups to file suit not only under the
CWA,22 ' but also pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of other fed-
220 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 188. As an alternative procedural argument to its standing
challenge, the defendant asserted that because: (1) it had achieved compliance with the
terms of its NPDES permit limits; and (2) after the successful appeal to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the facility at which the NPDES violations occurred had been closed, the citizens suit
was moot instead. Id. at 189. On this point, the majority found that the moomess doc-
trine would only serve to bar the plaintiffs action if it was "absolutely clear" that the viola-
tions could "not reasonably be expected to recur." Id. at 193. Since this raised a disputed
factual issue that was properly within the purview of the district court, the case was re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's decision. Id. at 193-95.
221 See id. at 189 (distinguishing standing from mootness). The standing doctrine arises from
the Article III limitation of the exercise of federal judicial power to cases and controver-
sies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In order to satisfy the standing requirement of Article
III, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the defen-
dant; and (3) that it is likely, and not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a fa-
vorable decision of the court. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
62 (1992).
222 SeeFriends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 187 (highlighting the challenge of successfully effectuat-
ing policy through legislation).
223 See e.g., Hudson P. Henry, Note, A Shift in Citizen Suit Standing Doctrine: Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 28 ECoLOGY L.Q. 233, 234 (2001) (recog-
nizing that the decision in Friends of the Earth increases access to courts for citizen suit
plaintiffs); Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on Future Justiciability De-
cisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1003 (2001) (commenting on
the decision's significance, especially in the environmental law context where most envi-
ronmental statutes contain a citizen suit provision); Kelly D. Spragins, Note, Rekindling an
Old Flame: The Supreme Court Revives Its "Love Affair With Environmental Litigation" in
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 37 HOUS. L. REv. 955, 956 (2000)
("For over a decade, the United States Supreme Court has misdirected the will of Con-
gress by seriously impairing citizens' standing to sue suspected polluters. That trend,
however, appears to be changing with the Court's decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc." (footnotes omitted)).
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eral environmental laws.22 4 Many had believed that as a result of the
Rehnquist Court's earlier environmental standing jurisprudence,
namely the decisions in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation225 and
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,226 the ability of citizens to bring suits had
been severely eroded, if not functionally eliminated.2
7
The retreat from the Lujan decisions by the Rehnquist Court in
Friends of the Earth is significant because Justice Scalia's views as ex-
pressed in the two Lujan cases concerning what was required for
standing in citizen suit litigation reflected a complete lack of under-
standing about the type of harm that noncompliance with the pollu-
tion control statutes can cause.228 The nature of the violations alleged
in the typical citizen suit-the discharge of pollutants in excess of a
few milligrams more than allowed in an NPDES permit issued under
the CWA;2 2 emissions greater than a few thousand pounds per day
over permitted limits in a CAA Title V permit; 23 or the failure to re-
224 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (CAA) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (RCRA) (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659 (CERCLA) (2000). Each cited section authorizes citizens to act as private attor-
neys general, allowing them to initiate civil actions against those who are in violation of
these environmental statutes and their corresponding regulations.
225 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
226 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
227 See, e.g., Richard Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741, 1742-43
(1999) (arguing that in light of the Court's standing cases, including Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, personal politics play a key role in determining who has access to the courts more
than any truly cognizable doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citi-
zen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1992) (criticizing Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife as having no basis in Article III and contending that the decision's
requirement of injury in fact fundamentally invalidated virtually all citizen suit provisions
present in environmental statutes).
228 Justice Scalia, who wrote both Lujan opinions, joined by Justice Thomas, did author a bit-
ing dissent in Friends of the Earth. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion on the
mootness issue, Justice Scalia predictably and vehemently opposed the majority's deter-
mination that the plaintiffs had standing. Justice Scalia stood by his position as articu-
lated in the Lujan decisions and made it plain that, absent a showing of actual harm to
the environment, the plaintiffs failed to meet the injury in fact element required for
standing. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
199 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]ypically, an environmental plaintiff
claiming injury due to discharges in violation of the Clean Water Act argues that the dis-
charges harm the environment, and that the harm to the environment injures him. This
route to injury is barred in the present case, however, since the District Court concluded
after considering all the evidence that there had been 'no demonstrated proof of harm to
the environment.'" (quoting Baggs v. City of South Pasadena, 956 F. Supp. 588, 602
(D.S.C. 1997)); see also GARBUS, supra note 1, at 185 ("Scalia and Thomas... first argued
there was no proof that the illegal release of mercury and other pollutants into the wa-
terway actually harmed the environment. They also claimed that citizen suits should not
be allowed at all, that only the individuals damaged could bring suit.").
229 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
230 42 U.S.C. § 7661-7661(b) (2000).
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port chemical releases at or above the reportable quantity threshold
as required by CERCLA23' and the EPCRA232-rarely, if ever, cause
demonstrable, concrete environmental harm. IfJustice Scalia's posi-
tion on what was required for environmental plaintiffs to meet the in-
jury in fact requirement of standing prevailed in Friends of the Earth, it
would mean that, absent a fish kill arising from a discharge of exces-
sive pollutants or a Bhopal-type of environmental disaster, citizen
suits under the various environmental statutes simply could never
proceed, since the plaintiffs would usually lack the injury in fact ele-
ment required for standing. The virtually-impossible-to-meet and
impractical element of citizen standing as expressed by Justice Scalia
in the Lujan opinions and in his Friends of the Earth dissent, of course,
is not at all surprising in light of his well-documented and overtly
negative view towards standing in citizen suits.
2 33
The rejection of Justice Scalia's restrictive views on standing in citi-
zen suits in Friends of the Earth, however, preserves the vitality of citi-
zen suits as a valuable enforcement tool under the federal environ-
mental laws, for Congress has clearly deemed citizens suit provisions
an important component of environmental protection, since virtually
234every pollution control statute contains a citizens suit provision.
Without diligent state or federal enforcement and a clear showing
that violations could not recur, after Friends of the Earth those who re-
fuse to or cannot comply with federal environmental statutes and
regulations remain subject to enforcement actions brought by envi-
ronmental groups acting as private attorneys general, even if violators
achieve compliance after suits are initiated.2 5
C. Countervailing Cases: Gwaltney and Steel Company?
One might assert that even with the Friends of the Earth decision
and its rejection of standing as defined in the Lujan line of cases, the
Rehnquist Court still had a negative impact on citizen suit enforce-
ment as a result of its construction of the pollution control statutes.
Those taking such a position could readily point to the Rehnquist
231 Id. § 9603.
232 Id. § 11004.
233 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983) (positing that courts must scrutinize more
heavily the requirement that plaintiffs allege specific, not generalized, injuries).
234 See statutes cited supra note 224.
235 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141,
1142 (1993) (critiquing Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, arguing
that "[t]he decision is difficult to square with the language and history of Article III").
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Court decisions in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion23 6 and Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment.
2
3
7
Without dissent,238 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Gwalt-
ney of Smithfield, found that the natural reading of the "to be in viola-
tion" language of the citizens suit provision of the CWA 2 39 imposed a
requirement that plaintiffs must allege "a state of either continuous
or intermittent violation" in order to proceed. 24°  Thus, after the
Gwaltney of Smithfield decision, CWA citizen suits were expressly lim-
ited to instances where violations were ongoing, and consequently,
citizen suits were no longer an available remedy to enforce wholly
past violations of the statute. After Gwaltney of Smithfield, if a violator
of the CWA achieved compliance before the citizen suit was filed,
then the prior violations are deemed wholly past violations and a citi-
zen plaintiffs' suit is foreclosed.241
Similarly, in the Steel Company decision, the Court faced the ques-
tion of whether a citizen suit under the EPCRA242 could proceed to
enforce wholly past violations arising from the failure to file certain
required annual reports detailing the presence and release of speci-
fied hazardous chemicals.243 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
found that the plaintiff failed to meet the redressability requirement
of Article III standing because the alleged violations had been cor-
rected prior to the filing of the suit.244 As a result, the declaratory
judgment sought from the district court-that the defendant had in-
deed violated the EPCRA-was "not only worthless to the respondent,
236 484 U.S. 49, 56-63 (1987) (holding that the citizen suit provisions of the CWA do not
confer federal jurisdiction for wholly past violations).
237 523 U.S. 83, 88-110 (1997) (finding that respondent lacks standing under the EPCRA).
238 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, concurred in part and in the
judgment. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 67-71.
239 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
240 Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 57.
241 While pre-litigation compliance may foreclose a citizen suit from proceeding based on
Gwaltney of Smithfield, the violator is still open to potential enforcement by the federal or
state environmental regulatory authorities for wholly past violations. See id. at 58; see also
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (conferring upon the EPA the authority to bring enforcement ac-
tions for wholly past violations).
242 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000). Among its provisions, the EPCRA establishes a net-
work of state, regional, and local agencies that serve as repositories of information con-
cerning a wide range of facilities that store specified "toxic chemicals," and that can pro-
vide emergency response in the event of a release of toxic chemicals above certain
threshold levels. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11003, 11021-11023.
243 Under section 313 of the EPCRA, industries within certain SIC Codes are required to an-
nually submit "Form Rs" that detail the manufacture, use, or processing of a wide range
of "toxic" chemicals above designated threshold amounts. 42 U.S.C. § 11023.
244 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 104-09 (1997).
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it is seemingly worthless to all the world.,2 45 Likewise, none of the
other relief sought by the respondent provided any remedy targeted
at any other alleged injury required for standing.1
46
The difficulty with reliance on Gwaltney of Smithfield as a basis to
claim that the Rehnquist Court was pro-business and adverse towards
environmental groups is that the statutory language more than sup-
ports the Court's conclusion that citizen suits under the CWA are lim-
ited to remedy ongoing violations and not wholly past violations.
Under the plain language of the statute, citizen suits under the CWA
are authorized by Congress against those "alleged to be in violation"
of the statute and not authorized against dischargers who were in vio-
lation. 47 As pointed out in Gwaltney by Justice Marshall, the use of
the phrase "to be in violation" means that Congress intended only to
subject those who were currently in violation, and not those who pre-
viously may have committed violations, to enforcement under the ex-
press language of the citizen suit provision.248 This conclusion also is
supported by the legislative history of the CWA where, in committee
reports, Congress referred to the citizen suit provision as an abate-
ment or injunctive measure. 249 Thus, once compliance is achieved
there is simply no longer any violation to abate or enjoin.
Therefore, with respect to Gwaltney of Smithfield, the proper con-
tention is not that the Rehnquist Court's decision is anti-citizen suit
and hence anti-environmental protection and pro-business, but that
Congress decided not to authorize citizen suits under the CWA solely
on the basis of wholly past violations. Under the express language of
the statute, the citizen suit was set out as an alternative enforcement
mechanism for ongoing violations that were not subject to diligent
enforcement by federal or state environmental agencies. 50  For rea-
sons that are not entirely clear, Congress did not see fit to extend the
245 Id. at 106. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg concurred in the judgment of the Court
but would have avoided the constitutional question altogether by following Gwaltney of
Smithfield to find that a citizen's suit under the EPCRA was unavailable as an enforcement
mechanism for wholly past violations. See id. at 112-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
246 See id. at 109-10 (majority opinion) (delaying an answer to the EPCRA question in light
of the constitutional limits placed upon the Court).
247 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(2000).
248 Gwalmey ofSmithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
249 See id. at 61-62 ("[T]he legislative history of the Act provides additional support for our
reading of § 505. Members of Congress frequently characterized the citizen suit provi-
sions as 'abatement' provisions or as injunctive measures.").
250 As mentioned earlier, the Gwaltney of Smithfield decision does not entirely foreclose en-
forcement for wholly past violations. Federal and state enforcement remains a distinct
possibility for wholly past violations. See supra note 241.
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ability of citizens to sue for ongoing violations of the CWA to wholly
past violations.
The Steel Company decision also is problematic as a basis to support
an argument that it demonstrates the pro-business attitude of the
Rehnquist Court over environmental interests. One must be mindful
of the fact that the Steel Company case was decided by the Court sev-
eral years before what is perhaps the most significant environmental
citizens suit case decided by the Rehnquist Court, Friends of the
Earth. 151 In defending against the citizen suit in Friends of the Earth,
the defendant also asserted that the reasoning in Steel Company pre-
cluded suit due to a lack of standing, but the Court rejected that posi-
tion and refused to extend Steel Company to the situation where com-
pliance is achieved only after suit is filed.252 If the Rehnquist Court
were clearly pro-business and clearly biased against environmental in-
terests, the Court should have been responsive to the opportunity in
Friends of the Earth to apply its Steel Company holding to also foreclose
citizen suits, even if compliance was achieved after initiation of litiga-
tion, but the Court did not do so. In fact, quite to the contrary, the
Court used the Friends of the Earth decision to draw back from the
near-impossible standing requirements plaintiffs in environmental
citizen suits faced after the Lujan decisions.
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, I asked whether the frequently as-
serted depiction of the Rehnquist Court as an anti-environment, pro-
business Court was an accurate characterization. It is my conclusion
that such assertions are not an accurate reflection of the Rehnquist
Court's environmental jurisprudence.
My analysis of the significant pollution control cases decided dur-
ing the era of William H. Rehnquist as the sixteenth Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court finds little, if any, support for the
proposition that the Rehnquist Court represented a period in the
Court's history where it was overtly inhospitable towards environ-
mental groups and clearly favored business interests over environ-
mental protection efforts. The pollution control cases analyzed in
251 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing Friends of the Earth).
252 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envdl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188 ("In
short, Steel Co. held that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to
assess penalties for wholly past violations, but our decision in that case did not reach the
issue of standing to seek penalties for violations that are ongoing at the time of the com-
plaint and that could continue into the future if undeterred.").
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this Article demonstrate no such unmistakable bias in favor of busi-
ness interests to the detriment of the pollution control statutes en-
acted by Congress, the associated implementing regulations adopted
by the EPA, or the citizen suits brought by environmental groups to
require compliance.
Surely, if the Rehnquist Court were an anti-environment and pro-
business Court, we should see within the significant body of pollution
control cases decided by the Court abundant evidence in the Court's
decisions clearly reflecting this favoritism. If the claims concerning
the anti-environmental, pro-business nature of the Rehnquist Court
were indeed correct, then one would expect to find multiple cases
where the Court reached decisions favorable to business interests and
inapposite to the positions of both the EPA and environmentalists.
The pollution control cases do not demonstrate any such stark bias.
What the opinions do show, to the contrary, is a Court that on a
number of instances accepted the litigation positions offered by the
EPA or citizens and environmental groups in their labors to further
environmental protection, and rejected arguments brought by busi-
ness interests challenging key aspects of pollution control statutes.
As historians and scholars continue to contemplate the Rehnquist
Court and its place in history, part of its overall legacy will no doubt
include the renewed vigor federalism suddenly enjoyed during the
Rehnquist era, after many decades of absence from the Court, with its
attendant limitations on congressional power and recognition of the
states as clearly distinct sovereigns. Rehnquist's legacy should not in-
clude, however, the view that he led an anti-environment and pro-
business Court. There is simply little foundation for such assertions
based upon the cases arising under the pollution control statutes dur-
ing the close to twenty years that William H. Rehnquist served as the
sixteenth ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court.
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